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This work is an investigation of Leibniz's concern with
the problems of unity. His concern with these problems is
understood to be central to his metaphysics. His distinction
between the unity of the individual as true unity and the
unity of the general as a unity only of thought is seen to
decisively condition his treatment of the problem of the
composition of the continuum., his determination of the being
space and time, of number, quality, and relation, and his
effort to introduce the scholastic doctrine of substantial
forms into post-Cartesian thought. The results of our in-
vestigation are: (1) an exposition of Leibniz's division of
unity into the modes of unity through itself and unity through
aggregation; (2) a determination of what unity is in the case
of each of its modes; and (3) an exposition of the relatedness
of unity in each of its modes to being.
Although the importance of the concept of unity for
Leibniz is often noted by his commentators, neither his anal-
vi
ysis of this concept nor the systematic implications of that
analysis have been successfully understood. We show that the
interpretations of Leibniz's doctrine to be found in Betrand
Russell's Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz
and G. H. R. Parkinson Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Phil-
osophy cannot be maintained. In the case of Russell's
C ri tical Exposition
,
the failure of his interpretation of
this doctrine is shown to invalidate the main critical asser-
tion of his work; namely, that Leibniz maintained an incon-
sistent set of premisses.
The central point of our interpretation is that Leibniz's
concept of substantial unity is precisely the concept of
transcendental unity to be found in that main current of
scholastic thought whose foremost representative was Thomas
Aquinas. The Thomistic analysis of the concept of trans-
cendental unity is not distinctive in scholastic tradition;
however, like Aquinas, Leibniz holds that the principle of
individual unity is substantial form, and this doctrine was
original with Aquinas. For Leibniz, the unity of a substance
is the undividedness of its being. Since for him, unity is
identical with being in re, substance for him is simply
undividedness of being.
Leibniz's concept of the unity of an aggregate is expli-
cated as the basis of his concept of phenomenality . We show
vii
that the unity of an aggregate is the numerical oneness of
the thought which, in respect of some abstract concept such
as time, place, movement, and shape, thinks the many reals
as singly real. This numerical oneness of thought is the
being of the aggregate; what he calls a phenomene bien fonde.
Finally, the
-suggestion is briefly investigated that the
theory of transcendental being may be usefully applied in the
field of interpretation theory. Transcendental being is
intermediate between subjectivity and objectivity, and it
is to this category that we may assign the interpreters own
historical experience of the text. Thus, an historical en-
counter with the text need not be regarded as constituting
what is merely subjective in the interpretation even though
such an encounter can have no objective reference in the
text itself. Jaspers's encounter with Nietzsche's Existenz
in his Nietzsche interpretation and Bultmann's encounter
with the kergyma of the New Testament are considered along
these lines.
viii
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Leibniz's metaphysics develops through constant reference
to the unific. His investigations into the being of space
and time, of number, quality, and relation; his interest in
the problem of the composition of the continuum; his efforts
to introduce the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms
into post-Cartesian thought -- all are decisively conditioned
by his distinction between the unity of the individual as
true unity and the unity of the general as a unity only of
thought
.
Historically and systematically, the problems of unity
are intwined with the problems of being. Together they con-
stitute the fundamental concern of metaphysics. In ancient
philosophy Aristotle determined the inseparability and
fundamentality of these problems, and his determination was
upheld by his successors. In Book I of the Metaphysics
,
he writes:
That in a sense unity means the same as being
is clear from the fact that its meanings
correspond to the categories one to one, and
that it is not comprised within any category
(e.g. it is comprised neither in 'what a thing
is' nor in quality, but is related to them
just as being is)
;
that in 'one man' nothing
more is predicated than in 'man' (just as
being is nothing apart from substance, quality,
2or quantity) and that to be one is iust tobe a particular thing. 1
And with regard to the fundamental character of the problems
of unity and being he writes:
The inquiry that is hardest of all and the
most necessary for the knowledge of the truthis whether unity and being are the substances
of things and whether each of them, withoutbeing anything else, is being or unity respec-
tively, or we must inquire what being and unity
are with the implication that they have some
other underlying nature.
In Aristotle's opinion, being and unity present metaphysics
with its most fundamental problem: namely, that of deter-
ming whether being and unity are through themselves or
rather, whether they are through something whose nature it
is to be being and unity. If we choose the latter of these
alternatives, the basic problem of metaphysics emerges as
the dual question: "what is being and what is unity"? The
problems of being and unity have been repeatedly posed in
this formulation and Aristotle himself poses them as such:
And indeed, the question which was raised of
old, and is raised now and always, and is
always the subject of doubt, namely, what
being is, is just the question what is sub-
stance? 3
Over and against the Aristotelian affirmation of the
inseparability of unity and being stands the tradition of
Plotinus and his successors. In keeping with Plato's fa-
mous remark in the Republic that the Good "transcends es-
3sence in dignity and surpassing power" 4 Plotinos posits
the One as the source of being, though in itself it is
without being. This is his meaning when at the beginning
of the sixth book of the Enneads he writes: "It is in
virtue of unity that beings are beings".^
Leibniz's thought cannot be squarely fit into either
of these traditions. It moves from one to the other with-
out the clear achievement of synthesis. Only the minimal
statement can go unqualified — that Leibniz's metaphysics
is throughout decisively informed by a reflection on unity.
The following concerns are, therefore, of important
consequence for Leibniz studies: (1) determination of the
different modes of unity, their relationship to one another
and their general systematic role in Leibniz's thought;
(2) determination of what unity is in the case of each of
its modes; (3) exposition of the relatedness of unity in
all of its modes to being. We will show that, with respect
to the work of Betrand Russell and G.H.R. Parkinson, that
these concerns have not been successfully treated.
Leibniz's analysis of unity must be approached
in light of the continuing discussion of this problem
since antiquity. We know that he made a close study of
Plato's Parmenides and since his teacher, Jacob Thomasius,
was an Aristotelian, we may assume that he was well ac-
quainted with Aristotle's classical discussion of unity
4in Book I of the Metaphysics
. Probably, however, the
classical formulations of the problem were not nearly as
decisive for his thought as were its formulations in
scholastic philosophy. it is likely that he studied the
original texts of Aquinas, Scotus
,
and Suarez, but the
present state of Leibniz research leaves us without exact
knowledge of the extent to which may have been influenced
by them. Leibniz's general indebtedness to scholastic
thought has been the subject of several outstanding studies
in this century. Maurice Blondel's research into his
development of the scholastic concept of a vinculum
substantiate 6 comes to mind in a special way since it
provided the basis for his own original position which,
in turn, has exercised a decisive influence on the work
of the contemporary theologian Gregory Baum.^ Our own
research establishes the area of his treatment of unity
as among those importantly influenced by scholastic
thought; here especially by that mainstream of scholasti-
cism whose most outstanding spokesman was Thomas Aquinas.
The special importance of Aquinas for these investigations
derives from the fact that Leibniz maintains the
distinctively Thomistic thesis that it is the substantial
form of a substance which makes it to be a unity. The
remaining aspects of his treatment of the problems of
unity can be traced to doctrines that were common property
5among the schoolmen.
For Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine that substantial
form is the principle of unity has the immediate consequence
that the intellectual soul is the only substantial form in
man. This doctrine was one of Aquinas's most controversial;
so much so that it was included in the bishop of Paris's
condemnation of 1277, though only to be exempted from it
some fifty years later. The difficulty was a simple one.
All the scholastics, including St. Thomas, held that the
intellectual soul is immortal. However, if the intellectual
soul is the only substantial form in man, then it must be
the form which denominates the matter of the body. To so
closely associate the soul with matter was felt to be, at
best, a denegration of the soul and, at worst, a threat to
its immortality. The contrary thesis, that there is in
man a plurality of substantial forms, was widely developed,
espcially among the Fransicians. According to this view,
the several substantial forms denominating man are of
various degrees of perfection; the most perfect being the
intellectual soul, the least perfect the forma corporalitas .
These inform the matter of the body in a hierarchical order,
the less perfect conferring the perfection necessary for
the reception of the more perfect. It is the hierarchical
ordering of the substantial forms denominating a substance
which, on this view, constitute its unity. No such doc-
6trine as this is to be found in Leibniz's treatment of the
problems of unity.
With the exception of his view that substantial form
is the principle of unity, Leibniz's analysis of what unity
is and what its modes are can be traced to doctrines that
were commonplace- in later scholasticism. Most of the school-
men agreed that unity is a property which all beings possess
just in so far as they are beings. Unity was thus said to
be a "transcendental property", that is, a property which
accompanies being in all of its divisions into genera
and species and so transcends those divisions. Unity was
not regarded as unique in this respect; truth, goodness,
perhaps beauty, and of course, being itself were held to
be transcendentals
. Each was said to be "convertible with
being
,
that is, every being is, in its being, one, true,
and good. This doctrine was commonly expressed in the
formula: " ens unum
,
verum
,
et bonum convertuntur "
. The
concept of conversion is, of course, a logical one, and
came to designate the identity of the transcendentals
after the observation that the propositions: "every being
is one", "every being is true", and so on, are convertible
simpliciter .
In keeping with scholastic thought, unity, for Leibniz,
means undividedness of indivision. He distinguished only
two modes of unity — the unity of a substance, or monad,
7and the unity of an aggregate. Accordingly, he distin-
guished two modes of being — being in itself ("ens per se
"
)
and being by aggregation ("ens per aggragationem " )
. a
school of fish, a flock of sheep, a herd, and an army are
some of Leibniz's favorite examples of beings by aggregation.
A substance is a unity for Leibniz insofar as it is un-
divided in its being, that is, insofar as nothing other
than it exercises its being. To use a formula we will
employ extensively, to say that a substance is a unity is
to say that its being does not admit of distinction into
being belonging to itself and being belonging to what is
other than itself. The unity of a substance is its self-
identity — its sameness with itself or, what is the same
thing, its difference from everything else.
In Leibniz's analysis of the concept of being by
aggregation we encounter some of his most original thought.
By means of this analysis, he hopes to achieve a synthesis
between the principles of the new science and the claims
of traditional metaphysics.
A being by aggregation may be defined simply as many
reals thought as singly real. The unity of an aggregate
is constituted by the numerical oneness of the concept
through which the many reals are thought. In one place,
Leibniz lists number, time, place, movement, shape, and
perceptible qualities as so many "abstractions of the
8mind" through which thought thinks the many. So, for
example, the unity of a school of fish is constituted by
the numerical oneness of the perceived motion of this
fish with the perceived motion of that fish, and so on.
It is important to see that this unity is a unity of
perception, or more generally, a unity of representation,
not a unity of object perceived. The motion perceived
and the perception of motion are, for Leibniz, one and
the same. In general, Leibniz's position may be stated as
follows: the unity of an aggregate is not a real unity,
that is not a unity in the sense of an unum per se;
rather, it is a unity only of thought.
An aggregate is neither a reality in the sense of an
ens Per se nor is it merely a thought-thing
. Rather, it
is a combination of both. Leibniz uses the term "well-
founded phenomena" (" phenomene bien fonde " ) to designate
the mode of being of an aggregate, and this formula is
aptly indicative of its double nature. The phenomenality
of an aggregate is constituted by the numerical oneness of
the concept through which thought thinks the many as
singly real. The singular reality which the many are
thought as is identical with this numerical oneness of
concept. Ultimately, the phenomenality of the aggregate
has its foundation in the divine thought.
The reality of the aggregate, on the other hand, is
9given by the reality of the many so thought. Thought has
here a real objeot - what it thinks are the many and the
many are real. what is phenomenal is how the many are
thought, namely, as singly real. While having no reality
of its own, a being by aggregation nevertheless has the
reality of its parts; its reality is not that of the
m-itself but that, rather, of the in-another. A being
by aggregation is thus not a mere phenomena or thought-
thmg having only subjective reality. it has objective
reality, but not as belonging to itself.
We should recall at this point the list of "abstrac-
tions of the mind" which Leibniz lists through which thought
thinks the many. These are number, time, place, movement,
shape, and perceptible qualities. We noted that these
and categories like them are constitutive of being by
aggregation. This, together with the foregoing analysis
of being by aggregation yields the result that number,
time, place, and so on are constitutive of phenomenality
.
These categories designate fundamental modes of generality,
and Leibniz extends his phenomenalist thesis to all modes
of the general. The general is neither Form (Plato) nor
law of nature (Aristotle) ; rather, it is a mode of thought
which constitutes a phenomenal object out of the many reals
so thought. Here emerges Leibniz's confrontation with the
new science. Scientific thought concerns itself exclusively
10
With the general. The individual is investigated not in
its individuality but in those respects only in which it
can be indifferently replaced by any other individual of
its kind. The thesis that scientific thought has the
general as it object has been lately taken up by Gottfried
Martin, whose investigations identify the origin of
scientific thinking with the Socratic discovery of the
general. 9 Leibniz's position on the new science may be
summarized as follows. Scientific thinking is by its
nature a thinking through general concepts. Such concepts
have no direct objective reference; they are ways of think-
ing the many reals as singly real. This singular reality,
or phenomenal object, is how such thought thinks the many
reals. Since what is thought is real, such thinking is
objective, that is, it is a thinking about objects; but
since it thinks them as singly real it refers to them only
indirectly.
With this analysis of scientific thought Leibniz hopes
to achieve a synthesis of the principles of the new science
with the claims of traditional metaphysics which grants
the validity of both. While scientific thought has an
objective reference it nevertheless fails to think objects
as they are, that is, in their individuality, and so cannot
contain the totality of truths about objects. The way is
thus opened for a metaphysical account of objects, and
11
for Leibniz this means an account which is essentially
Christian.
Like his confrontation with the new science, Leibniz's
positive metaphysics develops through an analysis of a
concept of unity — here, the unity of individual being
or substance. Following scholastic tradition, Leibniz
understands unity in itself as the unity of individual
being. And following Thomas Aquinas in particular, he
holds that principle of unity is substantial form or soul.
However, in the context of Leibniz's thought, the Thomistic
doctrine emerges importantly reinterpreted. Whereas for
Aquinas unity in itself is a result of substantial form, it
is for Leibniz substantial form itself. For him, individual
being, substantial form (i.e., soul) and unity in itself
are one and the same. Leibniz's answer to the question:
"What is true being and true unity?" is: "true being and
true unity is soul." In a word, Leibniz's positive meta-
physics is an attempt to accomplish the age old task of
philosophy to establish that our humanity is grounded
in being.
What follows is a summary of the plan and organization
of the work.
In chapter II, "The Scholastic Background" we will
present an analysis of the scholastic concept of transcen-
dental unity, in the words of Aquinas, "the unity which is
12
interchangeable with being". We will see that, for
Aquinas, unity" in this sense does not refer to numerical
oneness; rather, it refers to being as it is determined by
undividedness. stated otherwise, to be a unity in this
sense is to be undividedly.
We will also explicate Aquinas's original doctrine
that the principle by which a substance is made to have its
being undividedly is to deny that it possesses a plurality
of substantial forms, or, what amounts to the same thing,
it is to deny that the condition of its being is the condi-
tion of the being of distinct, that is, non-identical, sub-
stances. In chapter IV, "Unity and Being" we will see that
the unity to which Leibniz constantly refers in his writings
is the transcendental unity of the scholastics and that,
like Aquinas, he adopts the principle of substantial form
as that by which substance is made to be transcendentally
one
.
InChapter III, "Unity and the Continuum", we will pre-
sent an analysis of Leibniz's critique of the positions
held ky the Cartesians and by the Gassendists on the ques-
tion of the composition of continuous substance. In these
critiques we will see an application of Leibniz's general
argument for his view that substances must be indivisible,
and also for his view that matter cannot be the principle
of such indivisibility. Also, our discussion of the problem
13
of the composition of continuous substance will provide
us with an opportunity to examine the context in which
Leibniz's doctrine of substantial indivisibility can be
easily misunderstood to mean that substances cannot be
divided in the way in which a continuum may be divided.
In hlS
—
gic and Reality i n Leibniz's Metaphysics
. G. H.
R. Parkinson presents this reading of Leibniz's doctrine of
substantial indivisibility and in the final chapter, "Some
Recent Interpretations" we will show that Parkinson's read-
ing cannot be maintained.
We mentioned in the paragraph just above that Leibniz's
critique of the positions taken by the Cartesians and by
the Gassendists on the question of the composition of the
continuum is but a special application of his general
argument for the indivisibility of substance. In chapter
IV, "Unity and Being" we will present an expository analy-
sis of this general argument on the basis of which we will
show that Leibniz's concept of substantial unity is pre-
cisely the concept of unity to which Aquinas referred as
the "unity which is interchangeable with being". It is
in this chapter as well that we will see that, also like
Aquinas, Leibniz holds that the unity requsite for sub-
stantiality is the unity of substantial form, or soul.
Since the principle conclusions of our research are con-
tained in this chapter, a brief summary of its divisions
14
is in order.
The material of chapter IV, is divided into three
sections. In the first section, "Unity and Bodies: The
Issue in the Foreground" we will trace the course of
Leibniz's discussion with Arnauld over the question of
the unity of bodily substance. We will see that, accord-
ing to Leibniz, if bodies have substantiality, then they
must also have unity, and furthermore, that by which such
unity is constituted is substantial form. in this sec-
tion also, we will introduce Leibniz's concept of a being
by aggregation, what he otherwise calls a " phenomene bien
fonde"
,
and adduce the texts which establish that numeri-
cal oneness is the mode of unity of an aggregate, not that
of a substance.
In section two, "The Monad as Unum Transcendens" we
present our exposition of Leibniz's argument for the
indivisibility of substance and show that, for him, sub-
stantial unity is, as we have claimed, the transcendental
unity of which Aquinas spoke. Our exposition will require
the development of a partial analysis of Leibniz's concept
of a being by aggregation. We shall see that for Leibniz,
this manner of being, together with the manner of unity
appropriate to it, namely, numerical oneness, stands in
systematic opposition to the manner of being and unity of
a substance. With this analysis we will be in a position
erstand the key statement of Leibniz’s argument for
the unity of substance, namely, that without substantial
unity there is no foundation for being by aggregation.
In the third and final section of this chapter, "Unity
and Phenomenality
" we will complete our analysis of Leibniz’
concept of being by aggregation. We will see that, for him,
all being is either as the being of a substance or as the
being of an aggregate. Also, it is in this section that we
will see that the unity of the aggregate, its numerical
oneness, is the numerical oneness of the thought which, with
respect to an abstract concept such as time, motion, etc.,
thinks the many reals as singly real. We will see that
Leibniz considers these various abstractions to be so many
manners of relation and that the reality of relation, and
so the reality of the aggregate constituted by relation, is
the reality of the divine thought. In this way, Leibniz
answers a perennial question of philosophy, namely, "what
is the manner of reality of sensible things?"
In chapter v
,
"Some Recent Interpretations" we will
present a critical evaluation of the interpretations of
Leibniz's doctrine of the unity of substance as found in
Betrand Russell's Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of
z and G. H. R. Parkinson's Logic and Reality in
Leibniz's Metaphysi cs
.
We shall see that Russell interprets Leibniz's doctrine
16
the unity of substance as the assertion that to be and
to be numerically one are the same. On the basis of this
interpretation, Russell charges Leibniz with maintaining
an inconsistent set of premisses, and this charge of in-
consistency is the major critical contribution of Russell's
book. We will show that Russell's interpretation of
Leibniz doctrine of substantial unity is a mis-reading of
that doctrine and that, therefore, his charge of incon-
sistency, based on that mis-reading, is unsuccessful.
Also in this chapter, we will see that according to
G. H. R. Parkinson, substances are indivisible for Leibniz
in the sense of "indivisible" which is opposed to the
sense in which a continuum may be said to be divisible.
Since, for Leibniz, as we will see, substantial indivisi-
bility is substantial being, Parkinson's definition of
substantial indivisibility, and those like it, leave us
saying that substantial indivisibility for Leibniz is the
incapacity for distribution into parts. We will see that
in terms of Leibniz's argument for the indivisibility of
substance, this interpretation cannot be sustained.
t *"1 the concluding chapter, finally, we will apply the
results of our research to the traditional problems of the
self as formulated by Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature
,
and Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason . Also, we will
suggest some possible applications of our work to the
17
general problem of interpretation.
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CHAPTER II
THE SCHOLASTIC BACKGROUND
In this chapter we shall explicate Thomas Aquinas's
analysis of the concept of unity in preparation for our
investigation into Leibniz's systematic development of this
concept. As we noted in the Introduction, the significance
of Thomas Aquinas for this investigation derives from the
fact that Leibniz adopted an integral part of Aquinas's
analysis
; namely, that it is the substantial form of a
being which makes it to be a unity. Aquinas's analysis
breaks down into three parts: the distinction between
"the one which is convertible with being," i. e ., transcen-
dental unity, and "the one which is the principle of num-
ber”; the analysis of the concept of transcendental unity;
and finally, the relation between a being's unity and its
substantial form. Our exposition will rely primarily on
texts from his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Relevent material is also to be found in the Summa Theo-
logiae
,
De Potentia
,
and De Veritate
,
and we shall draw
on these texts as well.
For Aquinas, unity and being are themselves identical
though they may be distinguished conceptually. The unity
which is identical with being is not unity in the sense of
20
numerical oneness but, rather, unity in the sense of un-
dividedness or indivision. Commenting on Avicenna's view
that these two modes of unity are indistinguishable,
Aquinas writes:
The kind of unity which is the nrincinio o-f
able^eSgf
siKrl
posit any reality add^to^eing^ 1011 '
^Howe^
ber adds to “w WhlCh “ the Pri"cipie of n™-'h substance the note of a measure
Is^rst Ur^tSTSSTl0 '
The thesis that the kind of unity which is convertible with
berng is not the kind which is the principle of number is
of fundamental importance to Aquinas. in the following
passage from the Summa Theolouiae he offers an argument
in its support:
Avicenna,
. . . considering that the one whichis the principle of number added a reality tothe substance of a being (otherwise number madeUn
,
1
,
t1
^
would not be a species of quantity)
,
?
ht that
.
the one convertible with being
added a reality to the substance of beings; as
white adds to man. This, however, is manifestly
raise, inasmuch as each thing is one by its sub-
stance. For if a thing were one by“anything
else but its substance, since this again wouldbe one, supposing it were again one by anotherthing, we should be driven on to infinity.
Hence we must adhere to the former statement;
therefore we must say that the one which is
convertible with being does not add a reality
to being; but that the one which is the prin-
ciple of number does add a reality to being,
belonging to the genus of quantity.
2
21
The conclusion, not made explicit in the passage, is
SlnTC the ^ Whi °h iS with b^ does not3 3 reaUty t0^ ^ which is the principleOf number does add a reali ty to b^, it follows ^ the
- which is convertible wifch^ is not the
_ ^the principle of number mho ^. T e argument may be most plausibly
reconstructed as follows: Assume that unity is convertible
wxth being and that the kind of unity which is convertible
with being is identical with the kind which is the principle
of number. it follows that every being is one in virtue of
being a principle of number. But, a being „hich is one in
virtue of being a principle of number is not one in virtue
of its substance but is one in virtue of a reality added to
tts substance, that is, is accidentally one. But, by adding
a reality to the substance of a being, a new being is cre-
ated and this new being is one. But every being is one in
virtue of being a principle of number, etc. As Aquinas
makes clear in the first of the above passages, unity is
convertible with being in the sense of 'unity' in which it
signifies undivided being. However, since undividedness is
a privation, it does not add a reality to being.
Though the kind of unity which is the principle of
number differs from the kind which is convertible with
being, there is nevertheless "
them. He says:
a kind of likeness" between
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According to Aquinas, Aristotle shows that this is so in
Bk. I, ch. (i), 1
. i052a 15-20. m this section, Aristotle
repeats the list he first presents in Bk.A
, ch. (vi, of
the senses of 'one' in which things which are one by their
own natures may be said to be so. m Aquinas's text,
Aristotle says that in one sense of 'one,' what is contin-
uous by nature may be said to be one; in another sense,
that which is a whole may be said to be one (since the
movement of both sorts of things is indivisible with re-
spect to place and time); in another sense, the singular
thing may be said to be one (since it is numerically in-
divisible)
; and in yet another sense, the universal may be
said to be one (since it is specifically indivisible)
.
According to this, Aquinas says, the character of a measure
found in any class of things. His point seems to be
that the character of a measure is not confined to the kind
of unity which is the principle of number but, rather, ac-
companies all the different kinds of unity; e.g., the con-
tinuous by nature, that which is whole, the singular thing,
the universal, and so on. He continues:
But this character of a measure is a natural
consequence of the note of undividedness. Hencethe term one is not predicated in a totally
equivocal sense of the unity which is inter-
23
the one primarily^
°fly . 4
HlS V1SW SeemS t0 bS th3t the concePt of undividedness in-
volves the concept of a Measure, and hence, that the two
senses of 'one' are similar in meaning. m its primary
sense, however, to be one is to be undivided; only in a
secondary sense is it to be the principle of nu«ber.
According to Aquinas, the thesis that in its primary
sense, to say of something that it is one is to say that
It is indivisible, is sustained by Aristotle. Commenting
on 1. 1016b 3-10 of Bk.£, ch. (vi)
, he says:
He accordingly says, first, that it is evidentfrom what preceded that things which areIndi-lsible m every way are said to be one in the
^ich
Sb degree - F°r 311 the °ther senses inWhic things are said to be one are reducible
sense
' because it is universally true
are sa^to^ 1153 WhiCh d° n0t admit of vision
of division.
5
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The point, not to be found in the Aristotelian text, is
that since every indivisible thing may be said to be one in
the respect in which it is indivisible (for example, Plato
and Socrates are undivided insofar as they are man and so
are one m humanity—Aquinas
' s example), it follows that in
its primary sense (i.e., the sense to which all the others
can be reduced) to say of something that it is one is to
say that it is indivisible. Notice that the universality
of this sense of 'one' is being taken as proof of its pri-
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macy wxth respect to the other senses. The argument see.
to be that since
, for example, both one continue and one
whole may be said to be one in the respect in which both
are indivisible but may not both be said to be one in the
respect in which both are either a continuum or a whole
(since a continuum may not be said to be one in the respect
“ which it is a whole, and vice versa), it follows that in
its pnmary sense, to say of something that it is one is to
say that it is indivisible.
in its primary sense then, 'one' means the same as
'indivisible,' and it is in this sense that every being may
be said to be one. That is, whatever is is indivisible and,
moreover, its being is identical with its indivisibility.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the concept
of indivisibility must be taken as primitive in Aquinas's
account of transcendental unity. On the contrary, he
offers a sophisticated analysis of it. Indeed, that he
developed an analysis of the concept of indivisibility is
suggested by what we have seen so far. For clearly, he
cannot say that 'indivisible' means "incapable of distribu-
tion into parts," though this, or something very like it,
is its usual meaning. For on this definition, to say of
something that it is indivisible is just to say that its
parts must exist as numerically one, as opposed to sever-
ally, i.e., as opposed to numerically several. But as we
25
ave seen, Aquinas is at pains tQ point ^ ^
X mty 18 not the same as numerical oneness. Our task now13 ^ dlSC°Ver ^ AqUinaS
^-tinguishes between the two
Recall that for Aquinas, undividedness, or indivisi-
bility, is a 'privation'; that i <=
' to say of something thatU iS Undivided is
-t to attribute a property to it but is,
say that it lacks a certain property, namely,
dividedness. Clearly, this kinH r • •y, rn K d of division cannot be the
same as numerical division; for if it were, indivisibility
would be the lack of numerical plurality, and this is the
same as the possession of numerical oneness. Our task, then,
as to discover a distinction between division as opposed to
the kind of unity which is convertible with being and divi-
sion which is opposed to the kind of unity which is the
principle of number. In the following passage Aquinas
draws just this distinction:
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The passage is a difficult one and it will not be evi-
dent that our interpretation of it is correct until we have
examined additional passages. That he speaks of this kind
of division as implied' in the notion of transcendental
26
unity significant, but we shall not consider it at pre_
sent. Finally, it will be convenient to refer to the kind
° 1S1°n WhiCh iS implied ^ notion of transcenden-
tal unity as
-transcendental division,- though, to our know-ledge, Aquinas does not use the ter,. Now
, notice ^ ^
things which he speaks of as being divided by transcenden-
tal division are particular beings. Moreover, notice that
the notion of transcendental division is being explained in
opposition to the notion of division of continuous quantity.
For Aquinas, there are two species of quantity: continuous
quantity and discrete quantity. Discrete quantity is "that
which results from homogeneous parts which are actually
distinct (numerical quantity)
.
" 7 masmuch as discrete
quantity is as such in a state of division, it cannot be
further divided. (To divide the parts of a discrete quan-
tity is to divide a continuous quantity.) Continuous quan-
tity thus remains as the only species of quantity which ad-
mits of quantitative division. The point is an important
one, for continuous quantity is not being mentioned as an
example of one of several kinds of quantity which admit of
quantitative division. Rather, it is being mentioned as
the object appropriate to the quantitative mode of division.
That is, continuous quantity is that which admits of quan-
titative division. Since the notion of transcendental di-
vision is being explicated by way of opposition to the
27
notion of quantitative division, one would expect Aquinas
to mention the object appropr i ate to the transcendental
-de of division as well. As we have noted> he
Particular beings as being divided by transcendental divi-
sion, and in light of the context in which this occurs, we
should interpret him to mean that particular beings are the
objects appropriate to transcendental division; that is
transcendental division is the mode of division which ob-
tains between particular beings. Now, he says that partic-
ular beings may be said to be divided "by reason of the
fact that this being is not that being" and that the divi-
sion between particular beings is "caused by contradic-
tion. "8 His first point seems to be that to say of two
particular beings that they are divided is just to say that
one is not identical with the other. Second, that they are
not identical is "caused by contradiction." Now, in one of
the senses in which Aquinas used 'cause,' it may be defined
as "that which explains or gives the reason of a thing. "9
His point is-and this will be borne out by our subsequent
investigation— that for any two particular beings, the as-
sertion of their identity involves the denial of a neces-
sary truth.
Though we have pursued Aquinas's analysis of transcen-
dental unity to some length, we are still far from a com-
plete exposition of it. We have seen that to say of par-
28
tlCUlar bSin9S ^ "vlded is to say that they
are not identical. Shall we accordingly de£ine , indivis _
xhle being. as "a being incapable o f distribution into twobeings"? The most obyious
with ^
as that at seems not to distinguish transcendental unity
from numerical unity. For dearly, to say of a particular
beang that it is incapable of distribution into two or more
partacular beings is gust to say that it must exist as nu-
merically one being, as opposed to existing as numerically
several beings. Perhaps less obviously, the definition
does not make clear in what respect a particular being is
ancapable of distribution into two or more particular be-
ings. For example, might we not say that by sawing a desk
in half we thereby distribute it into two particular be-
ings, namely, two desk halves? Notice that the example
interprets "division of the desk" as "division of the desk
m resPect ° f its being a continuous quantity" and so in-
terpreted, it is simply false to say that the desk is in-
divisible. As we have noted, continuous quantity is not
the object appropriate to transcendental division, and the
task now is to discover the respect in which two particular
beings may be said to be transcendentally divided (and so
the respect in which a particular being may be said to be
transcendentally indivisible)
.
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First, it is clear that in this passage, Aquinas is speak-
ing of the same kind of division of which he spoke in the
previous passage from his commentary on the Metaphysics
.
that is, "the division which is implied in the notion of
kind of unity which is interchangeable with being. "11
The present passage, however, contains an entirely new
point, namely, that transcendental division is "division
according to formal opposition," that is, division by rea-
son of formal opposition. This idea of division by formal
opposition is the heart of Aquinas's analysis of transcen-
dental unity. The word 'formal' here means, of course,
that which pertains to form, and in the passage Aquinas is
thinking of substantial form. Thus, before we can under-
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stand what he means by , formai oppos . tionj , ^
understand his concept of substantial for™. We win expli .
=ate thus concept in two stages: first we win provide ageneral understanding of the concept through the idea of
subs ta.ntia.1 chancre snriang , a d then „e will turn to Aquinas's
specific development of the concept.
As a commonplace among the schoolmen, the concept of
substantial form stands in contra-Hi • +. •distinction to the con-
cept of accidental form, and it is through this distinction
that we shall approach the concept. The distinction is
easily understood in terms of another equally co.on one,
namely, that between substantial and accidental change.
We shall begin with the latter of these since it is the
more readily comprehensible . 12
Consider, for example, the change which a piece of
marble undergoes by which it becomes a statue. Now, in all
change, substantial as well as accidental, we can distin-
guish between that from which the change proceeds, here,
the marble, and that towards which the change proceeds,
here, the statue. Further, in all change there must be
something which survives, that is, something physically
present before the change begins as that from which the
change proceeds, here, the marble, and also physically
present after the change has been completed in that to-
wards which the change proceeds, here, again, the marble.
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Were this not so, it could not be said that a change had
- plaoe for there woul(J
wh^h
the present case, were there no marble physically pres _
ent m the statue, the statue could not be said to havebeen produced by a change in marble. i„ general, were
there no 'that from which' present in the statue, it could
not be said to have been produced by change at all; rather,
we should, have to sav •; 4-y that it was produced by creation.
Notice that what survives in this case, namely, the
marble
, is a complete natural substance, that is, its ex-
istence does not depend upon its having the form of the
statue. This is true of marble in general, and were it
not, „e should not expect to find marble in any form other
than that of a statue. It is because the marble present
^ ^ StatUS is a c°“Plete natural substance that the
change may be said to be an accidental one. m general, a
change is accidental if and onlv if wk-,4-Y hat survives the change
complete natural substance. In the terms of this
analysis, the concept of an accidental form may easily be
understood: it is, simply, the form acquired in an acci-
dental change.
Let us now consider an example of a substantial change:
the change which a seed undergoes by which it becomes an
animal. What, we may ask, survives the change in this case?
It cannot be the seed, for the seed is not physically pres-
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ent in the animal. Yet
„„ .
something must have survived for
erwise it could not be said that a change had taken
P ace. The natural reply is to say that while the seed it-
r
' dOSS n0t SUrViVS
' S°”e—ituent of it does, that isto say, some constituent of the seed survives to become a
constituent of the animal. This underlying substrate of
Considered in
itself, prime matter is not a complete natural substance;
ft is present in that from which the change proceeds as
well as in that towards which the change proceeds only as
constituent of a complete natural substance. Prime
matter is "pure potentiality" and has no actuality apart
from a relation to a determining form. Thus, we say that
a change is substantial if and only if coincident with the
completion of it, a complete natural substance first begins
actually to be. And now, simply, the form acquired in a
substantial change is a substantial form. For Aquinas,
every material substance is composed of prime matter and
substantial form. We turn now to Aquinas's analysis of
the concept of substantial form.
One of Aquinas's most innovative theses was that each
substance has only one substantial form. The contrary
thesis
— that in a single substance there can be a plurality
of substantial forms—is most readily identified with the
Franciscan school which adopted the doctrine following its
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development at the hands of qt
the doctrine is that hea ° SUbSt
— composed of primette essively deterained ^ a f^iffenng degrees of perfection. That is, the most per-ect form of a grven substance informs its prime matter
under the determination conferred by the next most perfectform, and so on down to the leac=-h 4-ast most Perfect form whichinforms prime matter per se mho i •E£ . T e doctrine is easily under-
stood from the point of view of the earlv P1 *. •a y latonists. Sup-
pose that there are such things as Platonic forms and that
they are arranged in a hierarchical order according to
their differing degrees of perfection. Now, on this view
to say, for example, that Socrates is a human is to say
that he participates in the form of humanity, and to say
that he is an animal is to say that he participates in the
form of animality, since humanity is a greater perfection
than animality, it is natural to suppose that no being can
participate in the form of humanity while not also partici-
pating in the form of animality. Thus, only having been
determined in respect of animality may Socrates be deter-
mined in respect of humanity; and this isd a rn 1S to suppose in him
a multiplicity of hierarchically arranged forms. 14
Aquinas's argument against the doctrine of the plural-
ity of substantial forms is a simple one. Recall that for
Aquinas, coincident with the acquisition of substantial
34
f°rm ^ Prlme matter
' * natural substance first be .tually to exist. More precisely ,
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' substantial form is thatw— confers terminate actuality on prime matter ,de-terminate 1 in the sense that the individual substancg ^onstrtuted has a unrque set of features), and, for a given
" 1V1<3Ual SUbStanCe
' 016 its prime matter is
;
tS^ ' Cle“ly
' thiS— , if the least perfect
°f " 9iV6n SUbStanCS iS * substantial form, then the
remaining forms must be accidental ones since they inform
a complete natural substance, that is, they inform a sub-
stance already constituted as to its nature, stating the
point in the form of its contrapositive, E"tienne Gilson
succinctly writes: "it is impossible by definition to in-
sert between the substantial form and its matter a number
of intermediate substantial forms. "15 It follows from ^
that a given substance can have only one substantial form.
Aquinas’s doctrine of the unicity of the substantial form
is a novel one. Maurice De Wulf reports that Aquinas in-
troduced the doctrine "in complete opposition to the ideas
of his contemporaries and predecessors ," 16 and speaking
confidently of the history of its development, he writes:
adontea
163
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Lt neither fr°ni his master, whop d a different solution, nor from the
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Peripatetic genus of scholasti-
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As a final point, we should note that for Aquinas, the
(whether substantia! or accidental of a composed sub-
stance is individualized by the matter which it informs.
By
'individualized' or 'individual' form we mean one the
type of which may be repeated but which itself may not be
repeated. That is, though there may be many occurrences
of the same type of individual form, each may occur only
once. For example, the whiteness of this page is not re-
peated on the next page, though the same type of form,
namely, whiteness, occurs on both pages. The doctrine
follows as a consequence of Aquinas's view that "desig-
nated matter" or matter "considered under determined di-
mensions" is the principle of individuation. (Matter "con-
sidered under determined dimensions" is matter considered
as occupying a determinate region of space.) Now, composed
substances are individuals, and the individuality of a com-
posed substance consists precisely in the determinate di-
mensionality of its matter. But individual or designated
matter individualizes the forms of which it is the subject.
Hence, the forms of a composed substance are individual
forms
.
Aquinas's doctrine of the unicity of the substantial
form is an integral part of his analysis of transcendental
unity. We have already seen that the notion of form is in-
volved in his account of transcendental division
,
19 and the
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' for instance, a white man?20 absolutely one;
That Aquinas is here using
..absolutely one- to mean the
same as " transcendentally one" is shown by his offering
the fact that everything has both its being and its unity
om the same source as a reason for asserting that nothing
13 abS°1Ute1
^ “«Pt by one form. For clearly, if the
source of the being of a thing is identical with the source
of its unity (in some sense)
, then whatever has being also
has unity (in that sense,; and the only sense of
.unity- in
which whatever is can be said to be a unity is its trans-
cendental sense. And, in the absence of a reason to be-
lieve the contrary, it is correct to suppose that the sense
which 'unity' has in the sentence asserted to be true is
the same as the sense it has in the sentence which gives
the reason for asserting it to be true. Aquinas's point,
then, is that since a thing has both its being and its
(transcendental) unity from the same source (as we would
expect, since unity is identical with being in rem)
,
and
since it is a form and one form alone by which a thing has
being, namely, its substantial form, it follows that it is
a form and one form alone by which a thing has its unity.
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Having seen that Aquinas's doctrine of the unicity ofthe substantial for, is an integral part of has analysrs of
transcendental unity, our tash is to explicate the exact
relation between the two. We shall begin by completing our
account of his analysis of transcendental division.21
Recall that we said that the substantial form is that
which confers determinate actuality on prime matter and
that for a given substance, the actuality of its prime
matter is its esse. 22 As we have seen, it follows from
this that it is logically impossible for more than one sub-
stantial form to occur in a single being. This is impos-
sible, we said, since, given the definition of 'substantial
form, if x is the substantial form of A, then every other
form of A must be an accidental one, since none is such
that the existence of A depends upon its having it. There
is another reason for saying this, if the esse of a thing
is given to it by its substantial form (in the sense speci-
fied just above)
,
then to say that a plurality of substan-
tial forms can occur in a single being. A, is to say that
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' ^ thlS
' in turn
' ^ to say that
not seXf-ide„tical
. To use an
" ^ 3 SimUar C°nteXt
' — a substance denom-lna ^ ^ the
of gold and also by the sub_
tial form of salver, it would have the being both ofgold and also of silver. In answer to the question:
"what
gold rs what this substance is under the denotation of
the substantial form of gold and aicn , _yuxa, lso, and for the cor-
responding reason, that it is silver, and consequently not
gold. What is a mixture of gold and silver is not either
gold or silver. Gilson writes:
contradictory
'
to^onceiv^as^elo ' lfc iStain being something otter than Sat 3 Cer~rs a lump of gold .itttftS of silverSn iS"StlW bifSat °£ 3 jewe1 ' cInnoSbet;
indeed, gold is only inasmuch as it is gold . 23
We are now in a position to define 'formal opposition'
and to explicate the meaning of Aquinas's assertion that
particular beings are divided by reason of formal opposi-
tion. 24 First, „e should recall that transcendental divi-
sion is a mode of division which obtains between particular
beings, 25 and that to say of two particular beings that
they are divided is just to say that "this being is not
that being," that is, that they are not identical
.
26 Par-
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ltY ° f lndlVldUal substantial forms in a singleemg. As we have seen nACS
' Possession by a single being ofa P frailty of individual substantial forms is impossible
since the esse of a single being cannot be plural, clearly,i possession by a single being of a plurality ey J- y of individual
substantial forms is impossible, then for any two particular
beings A and B, if A and B are identical, then there exists
a single being in which there occurs a plurality of individ-
tantial forms, namely, the individual substantial
form of A and the individual substantial form of B. But,
if in a single being there occurs a plurality of individual
substantial forms, then the esse of that being is plural
and therefore, that being is not self-identical. Thus, to
say that A and B are divided by reason of formal opposition
is to say that A and B are not identical since, necessarily,
no single being possesses a plurality of individual substan-
tial forms; and this is so since, necessarily, every being
is self-identical. Notice that since the identity of A and
3 is impossible, their non-identity is necessary. That is,
Aquinas seems to hold that for any particular beings A and
40
B
' if 1 “d B are not identical, then nen
' necessarily
, a andB are not identical. 27
We can now also spp = *What Aquinas means when he says
r10"" bSlngS ^ diVidSd *— - contradic-
-n. When we assert that R and B are divided ^^
ormal opposition, we are asserting that A and B are
necessarily non-identical since possession by a single be _mg of a plurality of substantial forms is impossible, when
we assert that A and B are divided by reason of contradic-ts we are asserting that, necessarily, A is not identical
"lth B Sin°e 11 15 imP°SSible a single being possess a
Plurality of individual substantial forms (or better, since,
necessarily, a single being cannot possess a plurality of
substantial forms)
. The difference between the two is that
in the former, the modalities are being asserted de re,
while in the latter they are being asserted de dicto.
Transcendental division, then, is division by reason
of formal opposition. More precisely, for any two particu-
lar beings A and B, A is transcenden tally divided from B if
and only if the being which would result, were A and B
identical, possesses a plurality of substantial forms.
Recall that, according to Aquinas, to say of a particular
being that it is transcendentally one is not to attribute
a property to it but, rather, it is to deny that it is
transcendentally divided. 29 As we may now see, his point
41
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ranscendental unity i s „ n _hy suc as to enable him to distin-guish between transcendental unity aand numerical unity it
— b61n9 that ^ ^ transcendentally one is to deny
t Possesses a plurality of individual substantial
forms. But this denial seems to be the same as the asser-
txon that it possesses numerically one substantial form.
That is to say, the oneness of an individual substantial
form of a being is the oneness which is convertible with
that being. Hence, the oneness convertible with being is
numerical oneness
.
in his paper, •'Form and Existence," Peter Geach argues
that we must distinguish between two senses of
-form' in
Aquinas. m one of these, to speak of the form of a thing
is to speak of "something individual, something that is no
mere multipliable or expressib 1 b\r .le y a predicate than Socra-
tes himself is. 30 In this sense, 'form' means the same as
what we mean by 'individualised form.' m its second sense,
however, to speak of the form of a thing is to speak of
something which can be multiplied. Consider the sentence:
42
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18 alS° What Plat° ““«= be if he is wise.,,. what
"that by which" refers to h •ere is an example of what ’form'
refers to in its second sense. This is the distinction wepreviously illustrated when we said that, for example,
though the whiteness of one page may not be repeated on an-
other, a form of the same type occurs on both pages. We
"rght say that in the second of Geach's senses,
'form'
means the same as ' form-tvnp ' t?te ype. For our purposes, the most
important feature about form-types is that, to use Geach's
words, they are
"indifferently one or many." He writes:
The common nature that the , . ,
stands for can be indifferent 1 v o'
1 man (say)
neither oneness nor manyness is a andof human nature itself. 31 mark °r note
Aquinas makes the point quite clearly i„ the following
passage from De Ente et Essentia:
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It will be useful to recall at this point that Aquinas
says that there is a "kind of likeness" between the sense
in which a being may be said to be transcendentally one and
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the sense in which it may be said to k
, ,
,
be numerically one
a o „ divisiQn Qf continuQus guantity
_
—us quantiUes Qf^ ^ical division. Speaking of the kinH f unity which is theprinciple of number, Aquinas writes:
of division which
S
pertains ^
lvation or negation
for number is produced by dividina
1
^
01"8 quantity;
Hence, number belongs tomafh ?? the continuous.
whose subject cannofexLt aplrf^* 1 SOience 'matter but can be considered acar^?” sensiblematter. But this would not •
f
r°m sensible
unity which is the principled 15 the kind ofrate from matter in^beinada f ?umber were sepa-
lmmaterial substances i and existed among the
unity which is of
Number cannot exist apart from matter; rather, it is pro-duced by the division of continuous quantities of matter
bet us say that A and B result from the numerical division
of a continuous quantity of matter c, if and only if both
A and B are portions of c, and A and B have no identical
limits. Also, let us say that a continuous quantity of
matter is numerically one if and only if each of its por-
tions has a limit (s) identical with the limit (s) of some
other portion (s)
.
We said earlier that designated matter, or matter con-
sidered under determined dimensions, individualizes the
forms (substantial as well as accidental) of which it is
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That is, each of the forms of a material
substance is countably one. we can now see why this is so.13 USS ^ C°nCeptS ° f "““rical oneness and many-
ness apply to matter that they also apply to the forms Qfich it is the subject. Joseph Bobik writes:
It is because that matter of fh Q uIS three-dimensionally extended LL3 * 031 universedivided into diverse parts f n *1 Xt can be
^Sj2e_counted as one ftL = h p3rt of whichdesignated matter 1!-"" La ? i at ls meant by
subjected to an apprLSftL Sach ° f which ' if
the same type can be introduced?!^'
3 f0rI” ° f
However, the concepts of numerical oneness and manyness do
not apply to what we have called 1 form-types . For example,
the type ’man’ may be individualised in many actually di-
vided, and so numerically plural, matters, or it may be
individualized in a matter which is actually undivided, and
so numerically one. As such, however, the type W is
neither numerically one nor many.
That the concepts of numerical oneness and manyness do
not apply to form-types enables us to provide a definition
of 'transcendental oneness' which distinguishes between
transcendental oneness and numerical oneness. Again, we
shall begin with the notion of transcendental division. As
Aquinas states, the kind of division which is implied in
the notion of transcendental unity is not the division of a
continuous quantity, 37 and we have said that ^ objects Qf
transcendental division are particular beings, that is.
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particular beings are to t-^nctranscendental division as continu-OUS quantity is to numeric l /, • • .O erica division, while this is cor-
rect so far as it goes, it overlooks hh» •i t e important point
that the division which obta-inc: u x.° ta ns between particular beings
is the division of a substantial form-type. That is
, for
any two particular beings A and B, A is transcendentally
divided from B if and only if the individual substanUal
form of A is numerically distinct from the individual sub-
stantial form of B, that is, each counts as numerically one
individual substantial form. 38 Let us confine ^
tion to a case in which A and B individualise the same sub-
stantial form-type, say, the type man. The type man is di-
vided inasmuch as it is individualized in A and again in B
Now, the division of the substantial form-type man in A and
B is transcendental division* that- -i <= tTi_ *. •, nat 1S
' what is transcenden-
tally divided here is the subst-an-f-ids tant al form-type man. Note,
however, that though the type man is divided in A and B, it
rs not thereby made such that the concept of numerical plu-
rality is applicable to it.
Let us define 'transcendental oneness’ as follows: to
say of a particular being A that it is transcendentally one
is to say that its substantial form-type is undivided in it,
(this is just to say that A does not individualize its sub-
stantial form-type twice)
. Note, however, that though the
substantial form-type of A is individualized in A only
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^
CS/ ^ U ' e " ^ f°rm'tyPe) 13 not hereby made suchthat the concept of numerical oneness
^ ^An undivided form-type is not a numerically singular form-type; iust as a divided form-type is not a numerically plu-
ral one. We thus obtain a concept of undividedness which
13 n0t 3130 9 C°nCept °f “ical oneness, namely, the
concept of undividedness which applies to the substantial
form-type of a particular being. The undividedness, or
oneness / of tJne f -i _-i -csubstantial form-type of A is the undivid_
edness convertible with the being of A.
Note that if A is transcendentally one, then it has
numerically one individual substantial form. This result
accords with Aquinas's claim that "the character of a meas-
ure is a natural consequence of the note of undivided-
ness. "39 we can now also see the point of Aquinas's remark
that there is a similarity in meaning between the sense in
which a particular being may be said to be transcendentally
one and the sense in which it may be said to be numerically
one. Just as the division which obtains between particular
beings is the division of a substantial form-type, so too,
the undividedness of a particular being is the undivided-
ness of its substantial form-type. But the undividedness
of a particular being is the numerical oneness of its in-
dividual substantial form. Hence, the undividedness of the
substantial form-type of a particular being is the numeri-
47
cal oneness of its individual substantial form. „owever
though the undividedness of the substantial form-type of ais the numerical oneness of A's individual substantial
form, the substantial form-type itself is neither numeri-
cally one nor many.
We have now completed our exposition of Aquinas's
analysis of unity and are ready to investigate Leibniz's
treatment of it. we have obtained a definition of 'trans-
cendental unity,' shown it to be distinct from numerical
oneness, and explicated the distinction. What is most im-
portant for our study of Leibniz, however, is the explica-
tion of the central role which the concept of substantial
form plays in Aquinas's analysis of transcendental unity.
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CHAPTER I I j
UNITY AND THE CONTINUUM
in this chapter we shau fcake some necessa^
eps towards establishing the thesis that Leibniz's anal-
umty ls in important respects identical with
Aqurnas's. First, we will examine texts in which he pro-
esses has concern to introduce the doctrine of substantial
orms anto post-Cartesian thought and offers his reasons
r
WlShing t0 d° S°- examine texts in which
e applaes his analysis of unity to the problem of the com-
posataon of the continuum. This last examination is neces-
critical as well as expository reasons. These are
as follows.
Both textual ly and theoretically, the continuum prob-
lem as an important locus of Leibniz's analysis of unity
and our anquary into his treatment of this problem will
yield substantive results with respect to that analysis.
However, strictly from the viewpoint of Leibniz's interpre-
tation, it must on the whole be regarded as unfortunate
that he addresses this problem at all, as his treatment of
it increases the likelihood of a confusion which, even on
its own terms, is already a natural one. For, in a discus-
sion of whether or not continue are infinitely divisible.
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one who holds, as does Leibniz, that continua result from
^visible unit£ (monads) as phenomena Qf ^ ^
be understood to mean that these units are ind • •ivisible
the sense of
.indivisible, which is opposed to the
which a continuum may be said to be divisible.
For Aquinas, as we have seen, the kind of divisibility pos-
sessed by continua is not the kind opposed to the indivi-
sibility Which is interchangeable with being, ("the divi-
sion which is implied in the notion of the kind of unity
which is interchangeable with being is not the division of
continuous quantity",.
^ It is also not the manner of in-
divisibility which Leibniz believed monads to have, though
we will not establish this until the next chapter. Thus,
readers who are familiar with Leibniz’s treatment of the
continuum problem and consequently are under the (perhaps
Strong) impression that monadic indivisibility is opposed
to the divisibility of continua may wish a thorough dis-
cussion of the issue. Indeed, as we shall see in the
final chapter, G. H. R. Parkinson, currently one of Leib-
niz's leading interpreters, holds that monads are indivis-
ible for Leibniz in precisely this manner.
By his own report, Leibniz experienced a decisive
turn in this thinking shortly before the composition of
the Discourse On Metaphysics (1686) and the correspondence
with Arnauld which arose from it, (February, 1686-March,
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1690)
. m an effort to determine what doctrines Leibniz
fxrst introduced in the Discourse and correspondence,
G ' “
' Parkinson concludes that neither work contains
original developments in the areas of logic and theology
but does contain an analysis of the concept of an individ-
ual substance not to be found in earlier writings. 3 As
Parkinson points out, however, only some of the Dis-
oourse^ doctrines concerning individual substances re-
ceived their first expression there. The doctrine of the
identity of indiscernibles
, for example, is not new with
the Discourse and correspondence. However, the doctrines
that every substance is or is like a soul, that every sub-
stance is
the whole
indivisible, and that each substanc
universe from its own point of view
e expresses
are original
with these writings. According to Parkinson, "although
they may be found in sketch form in Leibniz's earlier
writings, these doctrines date in their fully-developed
orm from 1686. of the three previously mentioned doc
trines which are original with the Discourse
, the first
two mark a point at which scholastic themes emerge in
Leibniz's thought, and he himself confirms that they are
new elements in his thinking. He opens the first account
of his metaphysical system to appear in print, "A New
System of the Nature and Communication of Substances,
etc. (1695)
,
with the autobiographical remark that
54
"r“” h
*
„
f ^ ?reatest the°logians and philosophers of our
"h0 had been t0ld ab°Ut —ain of my opinions by aperson of the^highest nobility and had found them very
paradoxical The reference is clearly to Arnauld and
Hessen-Rheinfels
, who spruesW e v d as intermediary in the cor-despondence between the two nhiin u° Philosophers. Leibniz next
proceeds to a discussion of the two above-mentioned doc-
trines that every substance is indivisible and that every
is or is like a soul. (it is indicative of the
importance which Leibniz attributed to these doctrines
that their discussion occupies the opening paragraphs of
rst printed exposition of his new system.) He writes
Aristotle,
a
i
t
aIcepted
n
the
YSeb
a
fr°m bonda9e to
it is these that best satilfi
<
\-?
nd
-
th® atoI?s ' for
what is merely naq ci„0—rf
Ilianter alone or m
infinity £
and o/n’ * * Wa ^ ^us necessary to restore/ it were
, rehabilitate the suhVi-^nfi aiforms which are in such disrepute slav b^t ~i „
Sh£? prooer
ra
Lke
S
from
m
t'
ntelli9ible a^ '«ParaSesP p us neir previous abuse.
6
Like Aquinas, Leibniz relates the concept of unity and the
concept of a substantial form; albeit the Leibnizian con-
cept or a substantial rorm differs (though not wholly) from
previous concepts of it. Aquinas receives explicit mention
m a similar passage in the Discourse :
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tending to^esuscitateTi 113 3 great Paradox in pre -
Philosophy, and to recai? tha ancienttial forms almost banished2?!^^^^- the Substan-But perhaps I will not bp ™ 2™ °Ur modern thoughtit is known that I hit i condei™ed lightly when
*
modern philosophy andlha?"? °ve" theto experiments in physics and^o^h^^ much timeor geometry and that I, too for t ? demonstrationspersuaded of the ba^iLo ' long tlme was
which, however, i waffin^f °^ these "beings"
again in spite of mvsel’f obllged to take upThe many investigations whirh*?
though force,
me to recognize that our rLdern^d^1^ °n comPel ledjustice to Saint Thomas and to ih ° I??1 d° sufficientof that period and that therP i ^ other P^eat menthe scholastic philosonh^e the . theories of
solidity than is imaained nr!
theologians far more
ones are employed a ^prop^s^.^fft^r p^ce.^'
What is the "previous abuse" of substantial forms to
which Leibniz refers and why does he think it paradoxical to
reintroduce them into
.-modern philosophy ? To answer these
questions we need only recall that the explanatory use of
which the notion of substantial forms was put by Aristo-
telian philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies was one of the many causes of the contempt for scho-
lasticism felt by the scientific community of the day. for
example, consider the following
'explanation' of the pro-
duction of fire offered by the Jesuit Toletus who taught at
the Collegium Romanum--i taly
' s leading university in the
sixteenth century-from 1559 to 1569: "The substantial
iorra of fire is an active principle by which fire, with
heat for an instrument, produces fire." 8 One is reminded
here of the doctors in the third ballet scene of Moliere's
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Malade Iraaqinaire who
'explained' th ,.~ ^ that opium produces
sleep because of its virtus dormitiva m a—j^ui-i . in answer to the
objection that fire does not- -,1OSS n0t always Produce fire, Toletus
writes
:
between thfaccldlntll'and^h^6^ diff—
e
The accidental forms have not-
8 °^bstantial forms,
but a definite repuananre
1
u
nly a rePu9nance
white, while between sSbshntiafrr 11 black and
a certain repugnance but it is L? ®re iscause the suhqi-hnf^i ^ Z l no^ definite, be-
things! Therefore lt ?on
rePeb
,
3 e™y ail
is an accidental firm, result- oni? f
hlte
' “hich
and not from blank ,Li a .° lY rom white
Agarnst the background of the dazzling success of the new
science's quantitative explanation of astronomical, physical,
and chemical phenomena, it is not difficult to understand
why the persistent efforts of the Peripatetics of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries to 'explain' natural phe-
nomena in terms of substantial forms and their occult qual-
ities—repugnancies
, sympathetic virtues, etc.—were ridi-
culed by the scientific community. Having summarized some
Of the efforts of the Aristotelians to explain the magnet-
ism of the lodestone, William Gilbert, a sixteenth century
spokesman of the new science, remarks in his De Magnete :
These fights, seditions, conspiracies in a stone, as
though it were nursing quarrels as an occasion for calling
m auxiliary forces, are the maunderings of a babbling
hag.
. .
" 10
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m
-ny passages in which he discusses the theo
substantial fornq T _,- u . J
th ,
mS
' LSlbniZ all^es “at it is of no use in
explanation of natural phenomena. The followi
Fro™ in .
al ow ng passaget m the Discourse is typical of these:
of^service^n thel
°
f
.
these *>™s is
not to be employed in the ™? Posies and oughtphenomena. m regard to this^^f10n ° f Particularschoolmen were at fault „ , last P°mt, the
cians of times cash l7 f , also the Physi-
thinking they had cine.
°llowe<5 their example,
ties of a body in mentio“nc
r
thr?o
f°r the proPer'
Without going to the troni??! ce
f rras
. and qualities
01 operation; as if one should
examining the manner
that a clock had a °"? be content to say
rived from its form = ^
ln amount of clockness de-
that clockness consisted. 11°
U d n0t tnquire in what
"e may thus surmise that the "previous abuse" of the theory
or substantial forms of which Leibniz speaks was its use by
certain Scholastics in their efforts to explain natural
Phenomena. We can also see why Leibniz acknowledges him-
self to be advancing a "great paradox" in introducing the
theory of substantial forms into modern thought. For,
given that for nearly a century past the theory of substan-
tial forms had been an object of derision among the modern
Philosophers, Leibniz’s assertion that the theory, or at
some part or it, could not be dispensed with after
all, must have been regarded as paradoxical. But if Leib-
niz did not revive the theory of substantial forms in order
to employ it in the explanation of natural phenomena, what
theoretical motivation lies behind his interest in it?
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Continuing our quotation of the ahn,™bove passage from the Dis-course
, Leibniz writes: '
standing' and
W
misuse
t
of
t
the
ere
h
WaS thiS lrisun<ier -
should not bring us to tt
substa»tial forms
recognition is so necessarv^i
®
way so“ething whosey in metaphysics . 12
WS Wl11 eXamlne the ^taphysical considerations to
which recognition of the theory of substantial forms is
necessary in the next chapter. At present, we should note
Leibniz's recognition that the metaphysical employment of
the theory of substantial forms is separable from its sup-
posed scientific employment Tn j-uP- . In the context of the thought
of the seventeenth century, an assertion isy ' of the separability
of scholasticism's science fmm .rom its metaphysics is a novelty.
For it was generally held, not only by the moderns but by
the Scholastics as well, that the downfall of mediaeval
science meant the downfall of the metaphysical and psycho-
logical doctrines with which it had been linked for cen-
tunes. Maurice De Wulf writes:
fended
r
en
a
M tiCh° f the seventeenth century de-
'•iddfe
hS sclence and Philosophy of themiddl Ages as a monument from which not one qi-nnPcould be detached without ruining the^ho™ idi-
of the qAhAt 4-
he scient;i
-sts ] made the philosophy
- S h lastlcs responsible for the vacariesor their science, and threw scorn on both” 13
The efforts of both, according to De Wulf, were miscon-
ceived :
ihe scientists wanted to destroy a still
oak tree because it carried dead wood inbranches; the Aristotelians thought that
powerful
its
it was
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» age-long tree,
would be to deprive it of
Wulr s eyes, it was the responsibility of theAristotelians to separate tt •
„
.
^Para their scientific from their meta-physical doct-rinnc.
'
‘ resP°nsability which would have been
ululled by the scholastics of old:
superanLaLd
h
Lience
a
and
C
def
aS
^
t0
H
SaCrifice their
and metaphysics. The princes^f thW Psychologyscholasticism would certainly 1 hirteenth centuryhad lived at the time of "ave . done if theyhistory of the sciences" bin tarnlng Polnt in theThomas show that he df^not regard"^6*13 ° f . St 'ideas as theses, but nfhi gard all scientific
thus he condemned in f hypotheses, and
successors??!
* advance the faults of his
Recall that having sketched the development of his interest
in the theory of substantial forms, Leibniz remarks that
the theories of Saint Thomas "and the other great men of
that period" possess "far more solidity than is imagined
Provided that these theories are employed a eropos and in
their place. "16 It is a not unreasonable conjeoture ^
Leibniz owed his recognition of the separability of the
metaphysical from the scientific employment of the theory
of substantial forms to his study of that mainstream of
scholasticism which was fed primarily by Thomas Aquinas.
WS haVe Seen that Lei^ relates the concept of unity
and the concept of substantial form; indeed, he identifies
substantial forms as "the principles of a true unity." 17
But what is meant by "true unity" here and how is a sub-
60
Stantial form a principle of such unity?
Ke tUrn n°W t0 the
"PPl^ation Leibniz mates of his
analysis of unity to the continuum problem and to how, bymtUe ^ thlS™—
- - - interpreted <in ojV1SW
:
miStakenl^ hold that monadic indivisibility isthe ^divisibility opposed to the divisibility of continue.
Leibniz developed his ge„eral theory of substance, andm particular, his account of the indivisibility of sub-
m conscious opposition to the prevailing theories
Of his day. Of particular concern to him was the failure
of these theories to solve the difficulties of the composi-
tion of the continuum, to which he frequently referred as
'the labyrinth of the continuum.
-the solution to which he
Claimed as one of the chief merits of his philosophy.
Bertrand Russell writes:
ls
e
i?s
S
preoccupation ^^3°' labyrinth" “th^
^
h
hl ^^ei:'\o
owLrrnion '
losophy?18
Ce ° f a11 beet in^L^ph"--
Latta offers the following succinct description of the
problem of the continuum:
carton
^o interpret the relation of whole to
u n
tha
,
L H16 continuity or complete unity ofthe whole shail not be in conflict with the de-finiteness or real diversity of the parts?19
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Leibniz Weis ^primarily engaged with two theories of
odily substance. The Cartesians held that the essence of
odily substance is extension, In Th^ringi^ of phi_loSophy, Descartes writes:
-he nature of matter or of body inaspect
, does not consist i n t • ts universalheavy, or colored, or one that
hard
' or
in some way ot other hnt ^
JIeci-s our senses
it is a substance extended T, the fact that
and depth. 20 length, breadth,
In consequence or this view, Descartes and his followers
denied the possibility of empty space; for since space is
identical with matter, there can be no space where there is
no matter
. The Gassendists, on the other hand, with whom
Hobbes, and later Huygens and Newton aligned themselves,
believed that bodily substance is composed of indivisible,
perfectly hard atoms, separated from one another by empty
space. in The Syntagma
. Gassendi writes:
whLT“?Aau'Chh
he f
^
med lnt° this visi£e
m
wor!d,
transformations o^of*which^^^ort^fifthf '
^
o les which exist in the universe are composed
.
21
(For present purposes, Spinoza's conception of substance as
"that which is in itself and is conceived through itself,
m other words, that of which a conception is formed inde-
pendently of any other conception " 22 can be classed with
Descartes' as, in Latta's words affirming "the unity and
continuity of the whole at the expense of the reality of
to
the PartS ''’- 23
*»«..
-ibniz endeavored
reconcile these opposing conceptions of substance:
to reconcile
h
the
1
notion°of
L
sib
n
t
Z an endeavor
with the contrary notion of suKi"0® 33 continuons
°-l indivisibi ^ elements mu ubotance as consistingtwo notions seemed to him to^aH?
03
J
'tlon of these
quate conception of sub hn« S from an inade-himself was that of deepening* the task he setof substance. 24 em the current notion
Though the difficulties of the composition of the co,tmuum emerge with respect to spatial, temporal, and nume:ical quantities as well as w-i-t-K
.
with resPect to extended quan-
tify, it adequately serves our purposes to confine our
attention to them as they are involved in the latter.
in critical writings directed against Descartes'
E£iS£iE!es, Leibniz defines
'extension' as "simultaneous
continuous repetition" (
"extensio eat repetito continue
^Hultan^"). 25 According to Leibniz, continuous repeti-
tion is one of two hinds of repetition; the other is dis-
Crete repetition:
?reither
e
discreti°
r
(as
ltitUd\0f the Sarae thin«s >
parts are discerned) • or is^r 3 Where ag9regate
He goes on to distinguish continuous simultaneous repeti-
tion from continuous successive repetition. Time and mo-
tion, he says, are continua whose parts are repeated suc-
cessively, while space and body are continua whose parts
are repeated simultaneously. As an illustration of the
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interdeterminacy of a continuum, Latta offers the
°f a rainbow:
eXa”ple
colour that ma^be^iscriSSSt^ 016 varieties ofthe usual division in o !, 'V" the rainbow;brtrary arrangement made by ^server!
.
27
“ ar~
Against both the* r-,v+-1 rne Cartesians as well 3 c ^
,
.
11 as the Gassendists,
6 a" h° ldS ^‘bodily substance, if there are bodily
substances, a doubt which he expresses to Arnauld-must be
composed of indivisible jnn.w n
" inat ls
, against
e Cartesrans, he holds that if there are bodily substances
ey cannot be continue constituted by simultaneously re-
peated parts, (that is, extension cannot be the essence ofbodrly substance)
. on the contrary, Le ibni 2 argues, if
there are bodily substances, the parts out of which they
are constituted must be indivisible, that is, they must be
parts which do not themselves have parts. Against the Gas _
sendists who, in agreement with Leibniz, hold that if
there are bodily substances they cannot be infinitely di-
visible, Leibniz holds that bodily substances, if there are
any, cannot be constituted out of parts which are them-
selves bodily, that is material.
ihe difficulties of the labyrinth of the continuum, as
thusly defined, led Leibniz to an analysis of the notion of
a part of a substance. In his discussions there seems to
be constantly before his mind the questions: What are in-
dividual substances? What must individual substances be
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like if they are to be ream, • a- •
.
.
.
Uy lndlviduals and not collec-tions of individuals?
Sha11 be91n 0“ aCcount ° f the difficulties of thecon inuum as Leibniz perceived the, with an exposition ofis argument against the Cartesians n. (m our exposition,the concept or a substantial part will -
p .
P 11 re«iain unanalyzed atfirst and gradually qiven con*. -
„
Y 9 “ C°ntent as we proceed.) In the
letter to Arnauld of November, 1686, Leibniz
writes that once it is granted that bodies are substances
and not phenomena,
"it might be inferred, x think, that the
corporeal substance consists neither in extension nor in
divisibility." 28 He continues:
poSte^f
e
t^o
d
or
a
of Tth^ C°"Sidered as a corn-
only extension there if ^?h°tbers ' and theConsequently, we shall Aever find a hod^r'which we can say that it if ‘ n 3 body of
rather
1 “ aggregate o^eever^'or
012 ''
component^arts Te 'ZotTl becaase the
and' we should never rea^h a reafbe?
ame ffficulty 'beings which result 1 belnS' r°r the
onl/as much r^ntVart^frrr
Sr^trti ^ the tbubstannIere'
whether we can it °?
e
' HUSt be indivisible;
ence to me.29
U lb S°Ul or “akes no differ-
The argument of the present passage is stated somewhat more
clearly in the following one:
Everybody agrees that matter has parts, and is
IsToTlTbJ,
a ”u\tipbcity of many substances,fl°Ck OX sheeP* But since everymuitiplieity presupposes true unities, it is >evident that these unities cannot be matter
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-UipUcities,
a- finally reguireci |-
“
t
"U
;
S
:°
ted ttat " ^— passage Leibniz doesno explicitly state fh a f %that he is arguing against the Car-tesian view that extension is the essence of bodily £ub _
However, in the immediately preceding passage it
-nee the argument of both passages is the sane, we mayinfer that, in writing the present passage, the Cartesian
view was surely in the forefront of his mind.
That every multitude presupposes true unities is a
tavorite point of Leibniz’s, occurring, not occasionally,
but throughout his writings. As both of the above passages
indicate, it is an important premise in his argument against
the Cartesians on the issue of the substantiality of ex-
tension; indeed, he elsewhere indicates a willingness to
rest the entire argument on this point alone. it is neces-
sary, then, to consider a passage in which he develops the
point at length:
greaation ^ "here there are only beings by se-g , there are not even real beinqs be-use every being by aggregation pre-supooses
tIinTitf°
Weirith trUS becausTft^b-ains ts reality only from the reality of theelements of which it is composed, so that itwin have no reality at ail if eiery be?ng of
aaMon
13
?
omP°sed is again a beina by Iggre-
tion for°if-
1SG
Y
e
^
mUSt Seek some other founda-to reality, seeing that by this method
ever
a
§i
neVer ^ reached
' even bY searching for-
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we have now before us sufficient texts to
.
.
,
presentLeioniz s argument against th^
.
9 l 8 ^ V1SW that bodily substance
of b
~ SXtended
- ThUS: that the essence
olLT LT
StanCe 18 eXtenSi0n
' — ' - Wiii be re-
efmed by Leibniz as a continuous simultaneous
repetition of parts •
-p
.
.
P NO”' lf matter has parts, says Leib-
niz
' it follows that it js »= ™ .i a multiplicity of several sub-
stances, as would be a flock of sheep."32 His poinfc . s ^lf thS eSS6nCe °f b°dily is extension, then the
parts whose repetition constitute that « +-extension must them-
selves be substances. Por
, if bodies are substances and
essentially extended, then the substantiality of a body
(which is an aggregate, must reside in the substantiality
of its repeated parts; ("the beings which result from an
aggregation have only as much reality as there is in their
ingredients",. 33 Now
, says Leibniz, the substantial^
whose repetition constitues an extension cannot themselves
be extended, for if they are, they in turn will be "beings
by aggregation" and thus, like that which they constitute,
their substantiality will in turn reside in the substan-
tiality of their parts. At some point, he says, we must
arrive at "true unifioc »
' that is, parts which do not them-
selves have parts.
To see why this is so, let us suppose the contrary,
US suppose that the substantial parts whose
that is, let
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repetition constitutes the extension with which we began
are themselves extend, ana that the pants o f each such
extension are themselves extended, and so on ad infinitum
Let 'A' stand for any one of these substantia! p^TTnce1S eXtend°d
' lfc is 3 substance only if the parts which
constitute it are substances. For if a is both extended
and a substance, its substantiality must reside in the sub-
stantiality of its parts. But the parts of A are them-
selves extended and so are substances only if each is con_
stituted by parts which are themselves substances. But
parts in turn are extended and so are substances only
if, etc., and so on ad infinitum. Hence, A is not a sub-
stance since the condition alone on which it is a substance,
namely, that its parts be substances, cannot be fulfilled-
and this because since A is an aggregate of parts to infin-
ity, the substantiality of every succeeding part stands un-
der the condition that its parts be substances. It follows
from this, according to Leibniz, that if there are beings
through aggregation, then there must be "true unities,"
that is, parts which do not themselves have parts. For if
P ts of a being by aggregation are not themselves with-
out parts but are also beings by aggregation, "we must seek
some other foundation for its reality seeing that by this
method it can never be reached, even by searching for-
34ever.
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It remains to see why this argument refutes the '
“*— -
—
“T“ “ -— «... ,« , sl„„Y subs tance
, though it is essential]
parts whose repetition •
Y eXtSnded
' the
tended r - h
“ a~ themselves ex-
t .
1 niZ h°ldS that if sorne thing is essentially ex-
” *
' ^ f°ll0WS th3t the P-ts constituting it are also
in r;-
ThOUgh the inf—
- - explieitly supported
th
r9UmSnt
' ^ 13 eaSily def^ded on the grounds of
e general, premise that the substantiality of an aggregate
1
^ the SUb—tiality of its parts. Thus
, suppose
at extension is the essence of bodily substance. it fol-lows that if A is a bodily substance, its substantiality
resides in the substantiality of the parts whose repetition
constitutes it. Hence, that to which the extension of A
essentially belongs is its parts for a hI / -to A as no reality over
and above the reality of its parts. Hence, if a is essen-
tially extended, the parts constituting it are extended.
Thus, against the Cartesian view "that the nature of
body consists not in weight, nor in hardness, nor color and
S° °n
' bUt ^ eXtenSi°n alone " beibniz argues that if there
are bodily substances, it cannot be of their essence to be
extended. The parts, he argues, whose repetition consti-
tutes an extension cannot themselves be aggregates consti-
tuted by a repetition of parts themselves aggregates, and
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so on ad infinitum
. Rather if v
,
' ^oaies are substances
;
y
br
beings through
—
——u.
;
secured oniy by s
——
-
stitutea by pa ts
T
do not th— -— - this
r
eeS Wlth ^—
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,
in opposition tQ
err view, he affirms that these parts ^not be material.
Z offers several arguments against Atomism, butor our purposes it will suf^ir^ +-- xx b ti ce to record hie •c a hls objections
to xt so far as it was propound as a solution to the
Problem of the composition of the continuum. In agreement
wrth Leibniz, the Gassendists held that material atoms are
sxtended and so have narfq u~P tS ‘ However, the Gassendists ar-
gued, though atoms have parts fh, t ey are also perfectly hard,
that is, their parts cannot be seoaratoA rD p ed from one another
Hence, atoms are indivisible and so satisfy the condition'
of being the true units of substance required to constitute
being through aggregation. To this Leibniz replies that
hardness' is a relative term, the concept of perfect
rdness is self-contradictory, just as is the concept of
the fastest motion. More importantly, however, he says
if perfect hardness were possible, it would only
guarantee that atoms cannot actually be divided; they re-
main nevertheless
'mentally divisible' and so their parts,
while inseparable
,
are still really diverse:
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Material atoms are enn-t- v-a vt, 4-~being stilTT^rther composed of' besidesinvincible attachment n f « f parts ' smce an
we could reasonably conceive o
t0 another
< if
parts. 36**
« ^ Sf^ ^>
ese
Thus, even supposing that the parts of an atom cannot be
separated from one another, that they are diverse implies
that the atom they constitute is an aggregate; and, as is
shown in the argument against the Cartesians, the substan-
tiality of a body cannot reside in aggregate parts.
With this analysis of Leibniz's critique of the Car-
tesians and Gassendists with respect to the problem of the
composition of the continuum we may conclude our examina-
tion of his treatment of it. Leibniz's own solution to the
continuum problem is not relevant to our present critical
and expository concerns and, moreover, is of formidable com-
plexity. 37 As we may now seej Leibniz , s application Qf h . s
analysis of unity to this problem readily leads to the in-
terpretative conclusion that for him, the manner in which
monads are indivisible is the manner of indivisibility
which is opposed to the divisibility of continua. For, his
analysis seems to be that while, as over and against the
Cartesians, the Gassendists are correct in holding that
continua must be composed of indivisible units, the kind of
indivisibility which they mistakenly sought for in material
atoms can only be found in immaterial units ("formal atoms"),
that is, monads. Since the kind of indivisibility the
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G— bSlieVed material atoras to— i-
- kind op_
Zr thS diViSibility conclude
th
13 ^ alS° the klnd ° f
“Visibility which Leibniz
this interpretation cannot be sustained. There it willbe shown that Leibni7'Q2 3 abOVe ar~t against the Cartesian
view that extension is the essence of bodily substance is
3 SPSCial
of a more general argument he of-fers for the indivisibility of substance. By detailed ana-
lYS1S ° f thlS m°re 9Sneral
-gument, „e will see that sub-
stantial indivisibility for Leibniz is not the indivisi-
bility opposed to the divisibility of a continuum.
We have seen that Leibniz sought to introduce the scho-
lastic doctrine of substantial forms into post-Cartesian
thought for what he identifies as their metaphysical func-
tion of serving as "the principles of a true unity." In
the next chapter we shall see that the doctrine of substan-
tial forms serves the same function for Leibniz as it did
for Aquinas; the function, namely, of making substances to
have their being undivided^ in the sense we identified in
our discussion of Aquinas as 'transcendental undividedness.'
Also, in our exposition of Leibniz's argument against the
Cartesians on the issue of the substantiality of bodies we
have taken an initial step towards unfolding his analysis
of unity and have explored the very likely possibility of
misinterpretation which i« ,nQ ^13 °Pened UP his application
3 anal^ is to the continuum problem.
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CHAPTER iv
UNITY AND BEING
n this chapter we will show thafc Leibniz , s treafcment
e unity of substance is in keeping with the scholastic
tradition which is both represented in Aquinas treatment
unity as well as established by him with respect to those
aspects of that treatment given shape by his original doc-
trine of the unicity of substantial form. We win accom_
Plrsh this by means of a detailed expository analysis of
Leibniz’s general argument for the unity of substance, of
which his argument against the Cartesian view that exten-
sion is the essence of bodily substance is but a special
case. Leibniz gives a very clear presentation of this ar-
gument in the course of his correspondence with Arnauld,
and it is on this source that we shall primarily rely.
Though we will draw heavily from this material, our exposi-
tion of it will be supplemented by analyses of texts whose
dates of composition span almost the whole of Leibniz's
subsequent writing career, and the arguments of these texts
will be seen to cohere with the basic doctrines of the
cited letters to Arnauld.
Throughout our analysis we will repeatedly touch upon
Leibniz's concepts of the unity and being of an aggregate.
As will be seen, this manner of unity and being stands in
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substantial unity and being. Leibniz's Coy bm c ncept of a being
' 9gre9atl°n C°inCideS
— “ concept of a weU-founded
—
and
_ consideration
^
“ WlU YleW SUbStantlve results both with respect to18 dlStlnCtlon ^etween phenomenal being and substantial
being as also to the apnorsige e al interpretation of his conceptOf phenomenali ty
.
The material of this chapter is divided into three
sections. In the first we will trace the course of Leib-
nrz's discussion with Arnauld over the problem of unity in
reference to the substantiality of bodies. This discussion
eventually gives way to the general consideration of the
nature of the unity in question, and this will be our con-
cern in the second section. In the third and final section
we will apply the results of our analysis to the interpre-
tation of some important aspects of Leibniz's treatment of
phenomenali ty
.
Unity and Bodie s
:
—
Issue in the Foreground
At the prodding of a series of rather concrete ques-
tions and objections from Arnauld, Leibniz, in the second
half of the correspondence, undertook what is perhaps one
of his most sustained articulations of his concern over
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the undividedness of beina n
, .
g * °Ur interpretation will drawheavily from these letters.
...~ i. th.
Th. al,cu„ loii ofprevious letters concerned Leibniz’s the •SS1S that "^e indi-v uai concept of each
all everything which can ever happen ^ ^ ^letter of duly 14, 1686, however, Leibniz lntroduces twp
new theses, and their discussion occupies the remainder ofthe correspondence (roughly, five-eighths). The first Qf
these is the
’’hypothesis of the concomitance or the agree-
ment of substances among themselves
,
’’
2
and we win not be
concerned with it onv ncern is with the second thesis,
namely, that:
Phenomenon^ like ^1^ “d n0t a simP le
united by accident or hv
'
n°r 3 being
a pile of stlnes Ht= Y
aggregatl°n, like
in extension
b essence cannot consist
.
, and one must necessarily
sllslaltiirf
hing there
ubstantial form and which corresponds insome manner to the soul. 3 m
To the modern reader, it may not be apparent that the
central concern of this passage is with the kind of unity
which bodies must possess if they are substances. Even the
careful reader who, noting the opposition between bodies
as substances and beings united by accident or by aggrega
tion, asks himself: how are bodies united if, supposing
them to be substances, they cannot be united by accident
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raising the issue of the kind nf° unlty «hich bodies mustpossess once they are supposed to be substanc
j-ha t- n .
es. Indeed,th t this is the i ssue with which eibmz is engaged in the[resent passage should be aboareni <-pp t to anyone familiar with
th
S
^
0laStl° th6SeS that ^ and unum are convertible andat that alone by which a substance is made to be trans-
cendentally one is its substantial form.
It may help to recall the reasoning behind this last
thesis. If unity and being are identical in re, then that
which makes a substance to be is also that which makes it
to have its being undividedly. Were it otherwise, unity
not be a tr^scend^tal determination of being. What
makes a substance to be is its substantial form, and hence,
it is its substantial form which makes it to have its being
undividedly. The present passage may be explicated as
follows: If „e suppose the body to be a substance, its
unity cannot be a mere unity by accident or by aggregation.
if must
, rather
, have a 1 i . ,substantial unity’ or an ’ unum
Her se- (Leibniz's terms); that is, it must have its being
undividedly. But how are we to secure undivided being for
bodies? since only a principle adequate to make the body
to be a substance can be adequate to make it to have its
being undividedly, Leibniz saw no alternative than "to
conceive of something there which one calls substantial
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f0rm "'' 4 <reCa11 that ^ was in order to find ,. the . .
of a true unity" that hv h '
Principles
L- by is own account, he
"restored" thetheory of substantial forms. 5
We noted earlier thit- rLhat it was readily apparent toArnauld that the cenf-r-^int al concern of the present passage isover the kind of unity which bodingy n es must possess once they
are supposed to be substances. This can be seen from his
commentary on the passage. The reader, indulgence for our
ratier lengthy citations is requested as Arnauld. criti-
cisms. and more importantly of course, Leibniz, replies to
them, constitute significant evidence in support of our the-
sis that Leibniz, understanding of monadic unity is in
keeping with that understanding of unity found in the work
Of Aquinas.
Arnauld offers seven critical comments in response
solely to the above-quoted passage from Leibniz, letter of
•July 14, 1686. Of these, only the first and third sre of immedi
interest to us. Arnauld writes:
rMi?u
r
v°‘V and our soul are two substances
a substantial^fn
N°W;
,
if We PUt lnto the bodyform aside from this extensionwe cannot imagine how there should be two dis-
tSfsubs^anSa?'/6 Cfnn0t See therefore that
we ca??
b
:u? soul J°
rm ^ relatioa to “hat
marhl^ wf •
t
?
e subst
?ntia] form of a block ofb e hich makes it one? if this is sowhat becomes of that substantial form whenit ceases to become one, after it has beencut in two? is it annihilated, or does itbecome two? The first is inconceivable,
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1
substa
iS ^ 3 ”Sre
—r
be said that it is a ™
Ce! and U °annot
mode, because then the
^
nn®r of being or a
this form Sould be the « St“Ce ' of «hichtension. This apparent? ' “°uld be an e*-
And if the subst^tilffL^shouirrinstead of one, why would not ?he °me tWO
without thL sub-
e shall discuss Leibniz’s response to these two points
detail. First, let us paraphrase the gist of some
of Arnauld’s other four points together with a comment
about their significance for our purpose. Por his fourth
Point, Arnauld asks Leibniz whether he believes that exten-
sion has a general substantial form such as the forma
S5£P°£^itatis of certain Schoolmen or whether there are as
many different substantial forms as there are different
bodies, differing in kind as bodies differ in kind. Fifthly,
he asks whether the unity which we attribute to the earth,
or sun when we say that there is only one earth, etc., is
to be accounted for by saying that the earth, etc., has a
substantial form. Here Arnauld seems to be confusing
transcendental unity with numerical unity, but Leibniz does
not raise the point. Finally, as his last point, Arnauld
mentions that the Cartesians "in order to find unity in
bodies" 8 have held that matter is composed of indivisible
atoms, in the hope, perhaps, that Leibniz will find this a
less cumbrous solution to his difficulty. If so, however,
Arnauld has again failed to appreciate Leibniz's position.
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' »* «<«««. „«Leibniz was engaqed i n -t-v,the preceding passaap ujy ge
, his commentsleave no doubt tt=. 4- u
with th .
that he UnderSt°°d to be concerned
e indivisibility or onlty
' ° °nene^- or unity of bodies.
the modern reader, however, this is not at all -a
•
H evident*
“ S ° ^ “ TOt in -idence that he is likely to
Arnauld was not responding solely to the pre-
ceding passage, relying for his understanding on material
Leibniz developed in a letter subsequent to that of
July 14, 1686, or in other material in that letter-neither
° f WhlCh COUld haVe been the Case
- Many of the exchanges
from this portion of the correspondence are striking in
this respect.
We shall now consider Leibniz's replies to Arnauld 's
criticisms. In a draft of his reply, Leibniz remarks ^
satisfied with what he has said about substantial
forms and that he finds several of Arnauld 's questions
difficult to answer. However, he does not voice his dis-
satisfaction in the actual letter sent to Arnauld. As we
shall see, some of Leibniz's replies are not satisfactory,
and it will be instructive to note which are and which are
not.
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In response to Arnauld's first orl)_. . .
answers as follows:
C1Sm
' L°lbniz
Sir/irt\atfo
£
ur
U
s“^anf YOU
,
P°int °»t.
substances really distinct°
U
H
b0d
^
are two
seems that the one is nSt i^h
hSr
!:
re
' ifc
form of the other. i reply^
substantia!
opinion, our body by itlelf «
ln my
aside, or the cadaver the soul left
substance onlv~bv n ca H-ed one
like a machine or m ??.?f the terE^
which are only beinaQ k pile of stones
arrangement, reqular
y
.
aggregation
; for
not matter to^SnSai^??' d°eS
Here Leibniz relates the concept of a substantial form tothe concepts of oneness and being . considered apart from
s SOU1
' °r
-^tantial form, the body lacks substantial
unity; it is not one substance, since, as he says else-
where, "„hat is not truly one being is not truly one being
either,.. we cannot say that the soul and the body by^TZ
self are distinct, for we do not here have two things be-
tween which to distinguish. Leibniz’s point is not that
since the body by itself is not numerically one thing it
cannot be counted as one of two substances (the other
being the soul) as Arnauld has evidently done. To this
Arnauld could easily have replied that since the soul is
distinct from each of the several things collectively called
the body,’ it cannot be the substantial form of the body.
To Arnauld's third objection, Leibniz develops material
of considerable interest to us. He writes:
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ofsto ^ PerhaPs 'cannot be considered a «=?^ st nes and thus
a coiiectioj, of Fo^le^us
3^06 bUt
there are two stones for aSSume thatmond of the Grand n7i , tance , the dia-
Mogul;
: one and the sLe"!^^ ° f the Grandbe given to account for hofh ective name can
said that they are a ?air o^'a
and 11 be
they are to be found a to
f dlamonds although
other; but i » , ?
don9 way from each
diamonds compose one°subst-t
aid that these
degree have no placl herf ??\ h"atbers ofare brought closer
-t-n ^
If therefore they
the point of contact thl
an?*?er ' even to
substantially united’on that^
1 nQt b® m°re
a fter contact one were ?o S™" 1 ’' and evenbody calculated to prevent^), ^ SOrae otherfor example, if one were to set'th™31311119,single rincr all +-U-,.. them in a
is called uAu^r Oldens “£r°?iy . whatthough by I^idiHt Th^T^' F 1<: 1S as
one and the same movement.’ll
3rG forced lnto
Like the body by itself, a block of marble is not a single
substance; rather, it is a collection of
.several substances
As the example shows, however, the several substances in a
block of marble do make up numerically one thing (namely,
one block) and can be collectively called by one name, just
as the two diamonds make up numerically one thing, namely,
one pair of diamonds, and can be collectively called by
one name. Things of this kind Leibniz calls 'beings by
aggregation.
' However, the one thing which these sub-
stances make up is not one substance, for it is one only
by accident; that is, it is not one in the way in which
a substance is one; rather, it is one in a different way.
The following passage, written to DesBosses, makes this
point explicitly.
85
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any organic bod^of nature
"13*63 30 animal or
with one dominant monad is far^f?"^31 unitya union which makes it a simnL E Srent from®s a plle of stones. The la?tera"re?ate sucha mere union of presenro nr ^ ,°OIlslsts inmer in union constitntu ° f place ' the for-
the Scholastics call it an f
neW substantiation;
they call the formed
The example of the two diamonds in a s^~lus .
;
" SSVeral SUbStanCeS Ca" make
“P - thing by ac-
i
SSt “ a Sln9le r1"9 ' the two d i a">onds are numer-
'
on tM,
„« tk. «.
„„ one^ Jujt u tK<
everal stones in a pile make up numerically one pile by
reason of their being in one place. However, it is by ac _
cident that the diamonds are one in motion; that is, it is
^ccidGntcil to ©apt -t-h=s+- j~that its motion is the same as that of
the others; ("it is as though by accident that they are
forced into one and the same movement "). 13 since it is fay
accident that the diamonds are one in motion, what they
make up on that account is one by accident. Finally, we
should note that that by which something is made to be ac-
cidentally one is also that by which it is made to have
being by aggregation. What has being by aggregation has it
in virtue of a property accidentally held in common by all
its constituents; (by 'accidentally held in common' we mean
that it is accidental to each of the several constituent
substances that it holds the property in question in common
with all the others). But this is also that in virtue of
86
which something is accidentally one 14 Thi „ .
. ^
y
- ls Point is con-s-ent with Leibniz view that to have being fay
n is the same as to have accidental unity. He writes toDesBosses
:
Being and one are convprt-iKio t.is being by agarpnafin ^ e * But as there
a unit by aqqreaat^on°
n
ten
alS° is there
and unity is semi-mental!l5°
U9h thlS entity
(^e concepts: unum shuttle and unum per accidens are
fundamentally equivalent.)
in his next letter to Arnauld (April 30, 1687), Leib-
niz abstracts from his previous examples and states his
account of accidental unity in general terms. Also, we
find that relation is the basis of accidental unity. The
text is worth having before us.
Our mind notices or conceives of genuinesubstances which have various modes thesemodes embrace relationships with otter sub-
tunitv
S
to
r
?
m wS th® mind takes the °PP°r-
en?er intt tto
to9ether in thought and
, v •
a o account one name for all thesethings together
, which makes for convenience
he fasonl2g- But one must not le? oneselfeceived and make of them so many sub-stances or truly real beings; that L onlyfor those who stop at appearances, or indeed
Sons ef°th
ake
-
r
J
alitieS °Ut of a11 abstrac-
tive VfaS®
mi
'
and Wh° conceive °f number,
' movement
-
shape, perceptiblequ lities as so many beings by themselves. 16
As is well known, Leibniz held that relations are ideal.
Our concern is not with his reasons for holding this but,
rather, with the function of this doctrine in his account
of accidental unity. it is Leibniz' s view that, say,
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C°me to thought of as one thino
a Pile, as a result of „ h "
9 ' namely-
O the relations which they bear to o
:::::
He™
-
-—
- :
b
ertain relatl°n t0
-— , namely
, the relation of
t0 °nS an°ther
' that ^ey may be said tQ fceone place, and so may be said to i-
.
Y S make up one thing. lf a
relation is constitutive of a kbeing
' then the kind of real-ity possessed bv th^y e
.elation will be the kind of reality
possessed bv thf^ • ,Y being it constitutes. Therefore, to sup-pose that relations are
.beings by themselves,, that is
to suppose that they have a reality of their own (i.e./an
1 intrinsic
' or substantial reality) entails that what they
substance Qr truly real being> „ s . nce
^ ^the contrary
, relations are ideal •d , what is constituted by
appearances.' (In his later writings, Leibniz
expresses the view that beings by aggregation, and so the
relations constituting them, are not phenomena merely but,
rather, ghenomene bien fonde'. ) ” The Ust occurring afc
the end of the passage ("number, time, place,
.
. .") is
noteworthy as a list of principles constitutive of phe-
nomenal being.
Thus far we have been supposing that the kind of
unity possessed by beings by aggregation is numerical
unity. This has seemed to be Leibniz's meaning, and we
will shortly examine texts in which the point is explicitly
made. But what of the kind of unity possessed by sub-
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stances? i s fhaf +.that
' to°' numerical unity? It- ,
that- it j „
Y ‘ fc would seemat x is, for he speaks of a block of m kh
a single substance but rath
th
'
Sr
' a col]
-ection of many, 18
us suggesting that an^^ ls distinguishabie
=^ resPect that things of theirst sort are (really, numerically one while things of thesecon sort are numerically many, though they are thought
as being numerically one. There is another passageW 1Ch SU9gSStS tMS interpretation
. In his letter to
Arnauld of April 30, 1687, he writes-
s;t!!
things. Being is onl reci^c a ibut the plural presupposes the s?9S ?n° ther;where there is not ageing stn 1 ^?ular ' . andthere be many beings. 19 9 ' U leSS Wl11
Leibniz has in mind the scholastic formula:
'ens et
unum oonvertuntur.
’ His mention of singularity in opposi-
tion to plurality might lead us to take his point to be
that while what is numerically one has being, what is numer-
ically several does not. On the other hand, we have seen
that Leibniz regards number as a principle constitutive of
phenomenal reality, not of substantial reality. 20 Th i s
latter interpretation is the correct one, though it should
be noted that m his early years Leibniz did attempt to
provide a metaphysical foundation for the category of
ber (perhaps falling short of the Platonic-Pythogorean
num-
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view that number is of fhot e essence of things)
. Thn= „
example, in his disserts*- •
' E° r
a ertation of 1666 (which i, k- ,
a . T . ,
v uj. n, m his letterNicolas Remond of July, 1714 , ,Y /
' he refers to as " a liHin
schoolboyish essay-) 21 he writes;
lttle
arises only ^roi/the^ivisi
16
^^
that number
and cannot be applied to i n™
° f the COntinuum
For number is a kind of
corP°real beings.
it were, which arises from^^0"631 fig“e, «beings whatever; for example rn!f ty ° f anya man, and motion taken toa^h ' an angel 'Since number is therpfnro g ther are four,
universality, it riqhtlv ,
s°methlng of greatest
if you take metaphysics to be^h
t0 metaPhysi cs,
c^sLHf^ingHi- «—- - a?f ° E
According to Leroy Loemker, Leibniz came to separate mathe-
matics from metaphysics during his stav in p • ,y n y l Pans (1672-1676),
having discovered that numbers are incaoablP ofp e maximal
determination.
The following passages show clearly that Leibniz iden-
tified numerical unity with the unity of an aggregate (W
ES£ £22£^tionem.) and distinguished it from the unity of
substance ('unum per se'l m
> • his letter to De Voider of
June 20, 1703, he writes:
“do
S
not
e
see h
aVS real beings and substances.
Of course tn w
e can av° id true unities.
ematics do not
unlties used in math-belong here, for thev can hoappiied as well to apparent entities such asali beings by aggregation— a herd, an army—whose unity comes from thought. 24 Y
To Des Bosses (April, 1709) he writes:
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be assigned^o^ouls 9 and^h
6 " 81011
•
are not to
tiplicity are not to 'be derived f
nity a"d Elul -
IuStanoe?25
titY
Finally
, m the same letter to Des Bosses, he writes:
being per s^because^his^a^o
J
8
b°
fc °ne
being pe/se “^' s bod*' which^s^ofon^
arithmUfcl!' b^t “Jaggregate, and has ancal, u not a metaphysical unity 26
Xt is quite clear that, tor Leibniz, the unity of . sub _
stance rs not numerical unity. Rather, numerical unity is
the mode of unity of a being by aggregation.
Let us return to our discussion of the Arnauld cor-
respondence. That Leibniz's replies to Arnauld' s first
round of criticisms are, on the whole, not successful, is
an unavoidable conclusion. For example, his reply to Ar-
nauld s third objection (what becomes of the substantial
form of a block of marble after it has been cut into two)
is evasive. As might have been expected, Arnauld raises
the same point in his next letter, of March 4, 1687, merely
changing the example from a block of marble to living
things which, according to Leibniz, possess true unity and
so are endowed with substantial forms. 27 Most important,
however, Leibniz has entirely failed to support his central
thesis, namely, that only that which has true unity may be
said to be a substance. Arnauld seizes upon this weakness,
making it the major point of his next round of criticism.
To this, Leibniz responds with a singularly clear statement
of his
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position, clearer by far, certainly,
to be found in the correspondence. Let us
ob j ection
.
than any other
consider Arnauld'
^t- araLV:hvLr^ts“ to sayingamcally united arP u nly mech-
machines or
shall^eil yor^anWy
t
that
1
in
t
that
n
th “l*
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nSSLSS^S- t™ SSStiLbodies Possess ^oirueunitvreb0gniZin9 thatshould be indivisi hi « a ^ ty ' ecause unity
ible
. Hence
d n° b°dy is indivis-
in soi rife
' Sre 1S no true unity except
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m°re than there ^ a true
that? * 'That th:re
C
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n d° y°U draw
bodies which have no
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In order that this conoid
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one would first ^ave?odef°
n^ be valid '
'substantial' in the foil ^
ne substance' and
attar s* 1,
philosopher who is not as entitled to sav- t
manne?
U
ofh
n°e that which is todaug'oj
maintain tw"?: and Who cannot consequently
there
th
?f ls Paradoxical to say tha/is nothing substantial in a block ofmarble, since this block of marble is not themanner of being of another substance and allthat one might say is that it is o 'a in
S™rs,5st,;*s
Arnauld 's criticism goes to the heart of Leibniz's
position; why, he asks, should we suppose that only that
which has true unity is a substance? By an analysis of
Leibniz's reply to this question we shall explicate his
concept of a 'true' or 'metaphysical' unity ( 'unum per se')
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^-iloil^_^s__Unuin Transcendent
With Arnauld's
„
.
critical remark that Leibniz has merely
0
8
f7 SUbStantlality -ue unity instead
.
9 **"* ““ 11 «• »*."«..*« O, «M,
correspondence achieves a deeper level than before
The argumentation. is no longer directed at the question ofthe unity of bodily substance; rather thi=, s question becomes
subsumed under the more general questions: what is sub-
stance? what is unity? how are substantiality and unity
related? The argument of Leibniz's reply i s one which is
familiar to us from our discussion of his argumentation
against the Cartesian view that extension is the essence of
bodily substance, 29 and in our exposition of it we win be
primarily concerned with only one of its premises. Conse-
quently, a brief restatement of his rejection of the Car-
tesian view win be helpful. To further facilitate the
discussion we will present this restatement apart from the
argument's specific reference to the continuum problem.
Finally, because our exposition is involved and accomplished
stinct stages, this restatement will be followed by an
outline of its organization.
As part of his reply to Arnauld's above cited criti-
cism, Leibniz writes that "where there are only beings by
aggregation there will not even be real beings." 30 we rmr
understand his thought to be that there cannot be a being
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constituted by infim'foinitely many aggregate parts. The con.cePt of such a being is ,3 self-contradictory one since, ashe says further on in the same reply
"a w .P Y ' being by aqqreoa-i°n obtains its reality from nowhere but that of
t
stituents We may ^ ^
° ^ —
contradiction to bethat the statement tta+- i_uthat the aggregate itself has reality
stands in contradiction to the statement that its consti-
tuent parts do not. These are contradictory since if the
aggregate itself has realitv if uy, it has it only having ob-
tamed it from its constituents. That the constituents have
no reality is precisely the condition of an aggregate con-
stituted by infinitely many aggregate parts. This is as
follows. in an aggregate constituted by infinitely many
aggregate parts, the reality of each part is conditional
upon the reality of its immediate constituents. These in
turn have their reality conditional upon the reality of
their immediate constituents, and so on ad infinitum
.
Hence, the condition alone upon which any constituent is
real, namely, that its immediate constituents be real, is
satisfied. As Leibniz expresses it, there is no
foundation (
' fondement ' ) for the reality of such a 'being.'
Such a foundation is provided by the reality of a being
endowed with a true unity, i.e., a being informed by a
substantial form. This statement is important for our pur-
poses. By explicating it we will achieve an understanding
the manner of reality possessed by beings endowed with
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true unity and on the basis of this understanding we willgive an analysis of the meaning which the phrase 'a true
unity' has for Leibniz.
TO this, the following objection may be urged
. It maybe objected that while it is clear that Leibniz holds thatit is because a substance is an unum per so that it may be
foundational of reality by aggregation, and while expli-
cating this claim may help in understanding what Leibniz
means when he speaks of substantial unity, here we are in-
quiring into substantial reality, asking: what is sub-
stantial reality that it is foundational of reality by aggre-
gation? in what way does knowing how Leibniz thought sub-
stances to have their reality aid in determining how he
thought them to have their unity? The answer to this pos-
sible objection is that it must not be supposed, as the
objection evidently does, that substantial being is one
thing for Leibniz and substantial unity another. We have
seen that he maintains the scholastic thesis "ens et unum
conyertuntur , " and it is a consequence of this thesis that
the question: what is the mode of being of substances? in-
quires into the same subject as the question: what is the
mode of unity of substances? Therefore, to ask of sub-
stantial being: what is substantial being that it is
foundational of being by aggregation? is to ask the same
question of substantial unity.
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What we win be trying tQ determ . ne , s
which the phrase ' a t, •
meaning
rue unity- had for Leibniz by an expli _cation of how beings possessing a true unity have their
reality. Thls explication win be accomplish by an anal .y-s of his statement that reality of this hind is founda-lonal with respect to reality by aggregation. Our deter-
mination of Leibniz understanding of the phrase - a true
unity- „m culminate by showing that the phrase designates
the unity which, in the words of Thomas Aquinas, is "inter-
changeable with being. " 3 3 We will proceed ^ ^ ^ ^
stages
. In the first stage we show that in an ordinary
sense of 'undivided- we may discern a common core of mean-
ing between Aquinas ' sense of this word as he uses it to
refer to the unity of being, and a sense in which it is
natural and appropriate to describe substantial being for
Leibniz as undivided being, with this common core of mean-
ing we will proceed to a second stage in which we win de-
termine that the fully articulated Thomistic sense of
undivided precisely describes substantial being for
Leibniz. Having shown that this Thomistic sense of un-
dividedness describes how Leibniz thought substances to
have their being, we will have shown how he thought them to
have their unity. The justification for identifying these
determinations was presented above in the form of a reply
to a possible objection on this point.
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we turn now to our explication of Leibniz's reply to
Arnauld criticism, cited above, as contained in his
letter to Leibniz of March 4 16 R 7 T • v/ ibo/. Leibniz writes*
unfS je: trr
^-^
e
Sn^Snthat
wo^;.
“ « SSa^i-
tinguishing between an InlTpeTU and'an
SfffaT5#^' subsSHtill-foa* andaccidental form, perfect and imperfectcompounds, natural and artificial ?Lsider matters at a much mo^ genehj Tevll
thft
ab
h
nd°nlng the use ° f terms, I believe'_a w ere there are only beinas bv aanr-0 _gatlon
, there win not even hP b-ina- •Hr eveifbilHgly
beings endowed with a true unity, becauseobtains its reality from nowhere but thatof its constituents, so that it will have
is again^ he'^V^ constituent beinga being by aggregation; or one mustyet seek another foundation for its realitywhich m this way, if one must constantly Y 'go on searching, can never be found ?34 Y
Several points should be noted at the outset. First,
Leibniz's argument in the present passage is fundamentally
the same as his argument against the Cartesian view that
extension is of the essence of bodily substance. Here,
however, the argument is to show that substance requires
a true unity. We see in this the link between the problem
of the composition of the continuum and the problem of the
unity of substance. Second, the phrase "the common run of
philosophers" C' les philosophes ordinaires ") refers to the
Scholastics. Leibniz's point is that he is using the terms
substance' and
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substantial' more or lesq
-i r.
•1 i s m their tradi-
txonal, that is, scholastic senses and not in unusual
senses as *rnauld accuses him „ f doing . Also
, it should
be noted that the phrase . being endowed with a true unity
refers to substances; Leibniz’s use of the expression is
ln rSbUttal t0 ArnaUld ' S—k that his (i.e., Leibniz's,
position depends solely on his definition of the word
'substance.
'
bet us begin our exposition by asking the following
question: what kind of distinction is Leibniz attesting
to draw in the passage by means of the phrases 'being by
aggregation' and 'being endowed with a true unity'? The
answer is that he is attempting to distinguish between
different manners of reality. For the argument is about
the kind of reality possessed by a being by aggregation
(namely, a reality which is through, or by means of the
reality of its constituents) and the kind of reality pos-
sessed by beings endowed with a true unity (namely, a
reality of their own) and the fact that a reality of the
former kind presupposes a reality of the latter kind. The
distinction may thus properly be called a metaphysical one
since it is drawn with respect to the different ways in
which things have their reality. it might be clearer to
say that it is a distinction between different modes of
being: the mode of being of a being by aggregation and
the mode of being of a being endowed with a true unity.
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“ * Pr°'"’“
“ ^ *« «* w_did understand by it, namely, the systemat,- •Y tematic investigation
of being qua being.
Having said that the distinction is of a metaphysical
1St ^ 537 What kind
- »°t. First, it is not a
mathematical or numerical distinction. The passage does
not provide grounds for interpreting Leibniz's concern to
be that a being by aggregation presents a numerical plural-
ity of beings while a being endowed with a true unity does
not. To suppose that this is the difference with which
Leibniz is concerned is to confuse the unity of substance
with numerical unity (or what Aquinas calls "the one which
is the principle of number ",. 35 second, the distinction is
not a materialistic one, nor one pertaining to mechanistic
physics. There are no grounds for supposing Leibniz's con-
cern to be that a being by aggregation may be divided or
distributed into parts while a being endowed with a true
unity may not. To suppose that it is is to confuse the
unity of substance with what Aquinas calls the unity or
indivision of a continuum
.
36
This latter confusion stems
from a misunderstanding of the relation between the problem
of the composition of the continuum and the problem of the
unity of substance. We turn now to what, on the basis of
the present passage, may be inferred in the way of an
analysis of these concepts.
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Leibniz wirite^ i m 4,7-
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6
^-mentioned passage that abeing by aggregation
"obtains its reality f
,
,
y rom nowhere butthat of its constituents," 37 that i <* +.s to say, a being by
aggregation has no reality of its own but only that of its
constituents. We tahe this to be a description of the mode
”9 ° f being bY legation. We may say that being by
aggregation is conditional, or accidental „ „•ental.
, or distributed
a.e., divided, among its constituents. By saying that aemg by aggregation is conditionally real we mean that it
as real only on the condition that its constituents are
-al. By saying that it is accidentally real we mean that
f°r it, to be is always to have only the reality of things
other than itself. The plural in this formulation is im-
portant since we want to identify accidental reality and
divided reality, of course, this identification will not
hold for accidents of a single subject. Finally, by saying
that a being by aggregation has divided reality we mean that
its reality is divided or distributed into the reality of
others. These several descriptions of the mode of being of
a being by aggregation may be condensed into the following
single description: a being by aggregation is a being whose
reality belongs to things other than itself. 38 The present
passage does not contain a description of the mode of being
of a being endowed with a true unity and to find out how,
as differing from being by aggregation, such beings have
tneir reality, we will turn to his claim that the reality
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of beings endowed with a iy-, 1Q • ,true Unlty ^ foundational of the
reality of beings by aggregation.
we want to deterge how Leibniz thought substanoes
(or alternatively, beings endowed with a true unity) to
have their reality in the light of his statement that such
reality is foundational of reality by aggregation. This
question may be broken up into four parts:
(1) what manner of reality is the reality of a being en-
dowed with a true unity?
(2) what manner of reality is the reality of a being by
aggregation?
(3) can the statement that reality by aggregation requires
a foundation be successfully interpreted in terms of our
answer to question two? and finally,
(4) can the statement that the reality of a being endowed
with a true unity is foundational of the reality of a being
by aggregation be successfully interpreted in terms of our
answers to questions one and two?
Let us begin by describing substantial reality as dif-
fering from reality by aggregation as 'unconditionally
real' as opposed to 'conditionally real.' while answers to
all four of our questions could be given using these terms,
they would not be illuminating ones. The greatest failing
of this pair of terms, however, is that the term 'uncondi-
tional reality' fails to generate a description of substan-
tial unity
. We are not here concerned to generate a de-
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scription of uni-f-v Kw
h f
aggregation. Such a description winbe formulated in +-v, Q „ 11ex section, where it win be pre-
sented as a definition, since we are not here defining
unity by aggregation, our description of being by aggrega-jon ™st not be understood as having the force of a defini-
L6t US Pr°Ceed then the term 'being in itself
«
intrinsic being') as a description of the mode of be-ing of a being endowed with a true unity, and retain as its
correlative our previously stated description of being by
aggregation as a being whose reality belongs to things
other than itself. This nair iIS p of descriptions will provide
us with answers to our questions one and two. Thus:
(1) a being endowed with a true unity is a being whose
reality is in, or alternatively, through itself;
(2) a being by aggregation is a being whose reality belongs
to things other than itself.
(3) The statement that reality by aggregation requires a
foundation is successfully interpreted by describing a
being by aggregation as a being whose reality belongs to
things other than itself. The interpretation is as fol-
lows. A being by aggregation is real only if it has con-
stituents endowed with a true unity; it is unreal (i.e.,
nothing) if all its constituents are beings by aggregation.
This latter thought is what we understand to be the meaning
of the following passage from the above quoted letter to
102™ ofApril30
, 1687; "Where there are only beingslegation there will not even be real^ „ 41m terms of our answer to question two above, this raay beinterpreted as follows. That whose reality belongs to
things other than itsp>l f i o .. .S 13 UnrSal lf things to which
i us rea lity belongs are such fhaf 4-u •C t t their reality in turn be-longs to what is other than themselves, and so on to in-
mty. In other words, since an aggregate has the reality
other than itself, if there is reality through
aggregation that reality must have a foundation
,or alter-
natively, a basis or a ground) in a reality which is not
through aggregation.
(4) The statement that the reality of a being endowed with
a true unity is foundational with respect to the reality of
a being by aggregation may be successfully interpreted by
defining a being endowed with a true unity as a being whose
reality is m itself and a being by aggregation as a being
whose reality belongs to what is other than itself. The
interpretation is as follows. Something has being by aggre
gation just m case it has being but only the being of
things other than itself. Consequently, since what has
being by aggregation has only the being of things other
than itself, it follows that if some being by aggregation
is real, that which has being in itself may serve as the
foundation (or alternatively, the basis or the ground) of
its reality.
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hllS ^ f°Ur qUSStions can ^ successfully answered
y e ining a being endowed with a true unity as a being
reaiity is in itself and describing a being by aggre-gate as a being whose reality belongs to what is other
than itself, the greater merit of our definition of a being
endowed with a true unity is that ity x gyrates a definition
of substantial unity. it is to the formulation of this
definition that we now turn our attention. Thls formula-
tion win be accomplished in two stages. m the first
stage we will show that there is a common core of meaning
between the sense in which Aquinas uses the term 'undivided'
in reference to the unity of being and a sense in which it
is natural to describe substantial being for Leibniz (i.e.,
the being of a being endowed with a true unity) as undividld
being. In the second stage we will show that the full
meaning which the term 'undivided' (and its cognates) has
for Aquinas in this connection precisely describes how
Leibniz thought substances to have their being.
What has only the being of things other than itself may
properly be described as having its being divided or dis-
tributed among things other than itself. Here we are using
the term 'divided' (and its cognates) in its ordinary sense
and not in the technical, or semi-technical sense in which
we used it m connection with Aquinas. To say of a subject
that it has its being dividedly is here simply to say that
it has its being separated into parts. We understand this
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thought to be an interpretation of Leibniz's as description of
*» «» „ „„„„
" “ *™ ”• «* ». ™.r. lh, t ,being by aggregation
"obtains its real! tv fi y from nowhere but
constituents ." 42 The phrase , a being whose
being is divided among things other than itself may be
taken as a description of a being whose being belong£J tQ
things other than itself.
If what has only the being of things other than itself
can properly be described as having its being divided among
things other than itself we may, with equal propriety, de-
scribe being in itself as being which is not divided among
things other than itself. More simply, to have being in
itself is to have being undividedly, and we may take the
Phrase 'a being which has its being undividedly' as a def-
inition of a being whose being is in itself. This is pre-
cisely Aquinas' description of the unity which is inter-
changeable with being (i.e., transcendental unity): "One,"
he says, "means undivided being ." 43 To the question: how
did Leibniz think substances to have their being? we may
answer with the use of the same expression Aquinas uses to
define 'unity' in the sense in which unity is said to be
convertible with being. We may say, that is, that for
Leibniz, to have substantial being is to have being un-
dividedly. Furthermore, since for Leibniz, to have sub-
stantial being is to be an unum per se, it follows that,
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for him, we may say that- t-n kqat o be an unum per se is to havebeing undividedly.
It is. Of course, true that Aquinas offers a sophis-
tacated analysis of the concept of undividedness (or in-
divisibility) as it applies to substantial being. His use
° f ^ tSrm
is a technical one when
he speaks of division
"according to formal opposition, «<
and we cannot, therefore, baldly assert that in Aquinas'
undivided,' substantial being for Leibniz may be
defined as undivided being. On the other hand, from the
fact that Aquinas uses this expression in a technical sense,
we should not conclude that it had for him none of its or-
dinary sense. We may conclude that there is a common core
of meaning between the Thomistic sense of 'undivided' and
the sense in which we saw it to be quite natural to describe
substantial being for Leibniz as undivided being.
We have at this point completed the first stage in our
endeavor to formulate a definition of substantial unity.
We turn now to the second stage in which we will show that
the full meaning which the term 'undivided' has for Aquinas
when he uses it in reference to the unity of being pre-
cisely describes how Leibniz thought substances to have
their being.
We have seen that Leibniz distinguishes between sub-
stantial being and being by aggregation, or the mode of
being of a substance and the mode of being of a being by
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aggregation. Observe that these modes of being are ex_
usive of one another. since what has substantial being
15 fOUndatl°- 1 t-ng by aggregation, it cannot itself
have its being through aggregation. Furthermore, since
what has being by aggregation is founded in substantial
being, it cannot itself have the being of substance, m
Other words, what has being in itself, or intrinsic being,
cannot also have the being of things other than itself,
and, conversely, what has the being of things other than
itself cannot also have being in itself. The point can be
simply expressed by saying that substantial being and being
by aggregation are exclusive of one another. Let us see
precisely why this is so.
Substances may be said to be distinct in the sense
that they are truly 'other' with respect to each other,
more simply, in the sense that they are not identical with
each other. On a form-matter theory of substance, such as
Aquinas', substances may be said to be distinct in this
sense and also in the sense of being numerically different.
While on a form-matter theory, these senses produce truth
functionally equivalent statements when predicated of sub-
stances (i.e.
, substances A and B are non-identical if and
only if they are numerically different)
,
they nevertheless
differ in their meaning. Distinctness in the sense of non-
identity results from form while distinctness in the sense
of numerical difference results from matter. An example
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from a Problematic to which the theory of transcendental
was orrgrnally responsive will serve to separate these dif-ferent meanings. The Three Persons of the Holy Trinity are
dentical with each other; nevertheless, they are not numer-
really different from each other. Were they numerically
different there would not be one God but, rather, three.
For Leibniz, substance is exclusively form, and substances
may be said to be distinct only in the sense of being non-
identical. Numerosity for him is mere phenomena, more pre-
cisely, numerical oneness is the manner of unity appropriate
to being by aggregation.
Let us say then that, for Leibniz, to have being by
aggregation is to have the being of distinct substances
using 'distinct' to refer to non-identity. Unless the con-
stituents of a being by aggregation are distinct from each
other, there will not be an aggregate
. Substances are dis-
tinct inasmuch as the being of distinct substances admits
of distinction into what belongs to one substance and what
belongs to another. This latter idea may be taken as merely
a further articulation of our description of a being by ag-
gregation as a being whose being is divided or distributed
among things other than itself.
The mutual exclusivity of substantial being and being
by aggregation is demonstrated as follows. If what has
being m itself, or intrinsic being also has the being of
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distinct substances (i.e., also has being which admits ofistinction into what belongs to this substance and whatbelongs to th^ substance, etc.,, then it has the being ofdistinct substances intrinsic to it. What has the being ofdistinct substances intrinsic to it is not self-identical
in answer to the question: what is it? we would have to say:
and such and it is also what is other than a
such and such. it is precisely because what has substantial
being (or intrinsic being, or being in itself) ls self _
identical that it cannot also have being by aggregation.
More generally, it is precisely its mode of unity that pre-
vents substantial being from also having the being of an
aggregate. Similarly, it is the mode of unity of a being
by aggregation, namely, numerical oneness, that prevents it
from also having the being of a substance. If what has the
being of distinct substances (i.e., what has being by ag-
gregation) also has being in itself, then that being is
shared by each of those distinct substances. That is to
say, to each of several things other than itself belongs
being intrinsic to it. Consequently, its constituents are
what it intrinsically is; more simply, it is its several
constituent substances. If what has the being of distinct
substances also has being in itself it thus loses its nu-
merical oneness and becomes numerically several.
Unity is, so to speak, the boundary between substantial
being and being by aggregation. It is its self-identity
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Which prevents what has substantial being from
being by aggregation and, similarly, it is its
also having
numerical
oneness which prevents what has being by
also having substantial being.
aggregation from
We are now
lated Thomistic
in a position to show that the fully articu-
sense of 'undivided being' exactly describes
substantial being for Leibni
called, substantial form is
actuality on prime matter,
tuality of its prime matter
z * For Aquinas, it will be re-
that which confers determinate
For a given substance, the ac-
•
•
, 4 sis its esse
. We also saw
that, for Aquinas, substances have their being divided
"according to formal opposition ," 46 and we said that such
division is transcendental division. We defined transcen-
dental division as follows: for two substances A and B,
A is transcendents lly divided from B if and only if the
being which would result were A and B identical, possesses
a plurality of substantial forms. Finally, we said that,
for Aquinas, to say of a substance that it is transcen-
dentally undivided is merely to deny that it is transcen-
dentally divided; in other words, it is to deny that its
esse is plural. in accordance with our present terminology
of distinctness in the sense of non-identity, Aquinas'
idea may be expressed as follows. To say of a substance
that it is undivided is just to deny that the condition of
its being is the condition of the being of distinct sub-
stances, insofar as they are distinct; i.e., insofar as
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their being admits of distinction intQ what tQ ^
substance, to another, and so on.
Turning now to Leibniz, we established above that to
say of a substance that it is self-identical is just to say
that its being does not admit of distinction into being be-
longing to what is other than itself; that is, it is just
to deny that the condition of its being is the condition of
the being of distinct substances. Thus, undividedness of
being is for Aquinas what self-identity of being is for
Leibniz. Since, for Leibniz, the being of a substance is
its self-identity, it follows that substantial being for
Leibniz is what undividedness of being is for Aquinas.
We said earlier that since, for Leibniz, substantial
being is identical with substantial unity, to answer the
question: how did Leibniz think substances to have their
being? is to answer the question: how did Leibniz think
substances to have their unity? We have seen that, for
Leibniz, to have substantial being is to have being undi-
videdly, m the Thomistic sense in which to say of a sub-
stance that it has its being undividedly is just to deny
that the condition of its being is the condition of the
being of distinct substances. We may conclude that the
unity, or oneness of substance of which Leibniz speaks is
what Aquinas referred to as "the unity which is inter-
changeable with being ."'17
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we have now coveted the second stage of our endeavor
to formulate a definition of substantial unity for Leibniz
TO say Of a substance that it is a unity is to say that it
has rts being undividedly in what we have explicated as the
Thomrstic sense of denying that the condition of its being
13 “e C°nditi0n ° f the distinct substances. We
formulated this definition by an analysis of Leibniz' state-
ment that the reality of a being endowed with a true unity
is fundational with respect to the reality of a being by
aggregation. Since to be an unum per se is, for Leibniz,
to be an ens per se, to define substantial unity is to de-
fine substantial being. Consequently, the four questions
into which we divided his statement that the reality of a
being endowed with a true unity is foundational of the
reality of a being by aggregation must be answerable in
terms of our current definition of the unity of a being
endowed with a true unity (i.e., a substance). Let us
then return to our four questions now defining substantial
being as undivided being in the sense specified just above
and describing being by aggregation as having the being of
distinct substances, which we identified above as merely
a further articulation of our description of being by ag-
gregation as being which is divided or distributed among
things other than itself. Thus:
(1) a being endowed with a true unity is a being whose
reality does not admit of distinction into being belonging
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to what is other than itself;
(2) a being by aggregation is a being whose reaUty
to its distinct constituent substances;
(3) the statement that reality by aggregation reguires a
foundation is successfully interpreted by describing a
being by aggregation as a being whose reality belongs to
its distinct constituent substances. The interpretation is
as follows: that whose reality belongs to its distinct con-
stituent substances is unreal if those distinct constituents
are themselves such that their reality in turn belongs to
distinct substances constituting them. Thus, a being whose
reality belongs to its distinct constituent substances must
have a foundation in a reality which does not itself in
turn belong to distinct substances;
(4)
The statement that the reality of a being endowed with
a true unity is foundational with respect to the reality of
a being by aggregation may be successfully interpreted by
defining a being endowed with a true unity as a being whose
reality does not admit of distinction into being belonging
to what is other than itself, and a being by aggregation as
a being whose reality belongs to its distinct constituent
substances. The interpretation is as follows: since what
has being by aggregation has its being as belonging to its
c^ s^ nc ^: constituent substances, what has being which does
net admit of distinction into being belonging to what is
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other than itself may
ity
.
serve as the foundation of its real-
m addition to their expository function, our four
questrons have a critical function as well. They show^
Leibniz concept of substantial unity is neither a mathe-
materiallstic Qne
^ Let ^ ^ tQ answer
them by turning them into questions about unity and defin-
ing substantial unity mathematically as numerical oneness
and then materialistically as the indivisibility which is
opposed to the divisibility of a continuum. Our questions
two and three are concerned, respectively, with a descrip-
tion of being by aggregation and a justification of that
description and they, as well as our answers to them just
above, can remain the same for our present purpose.
Let us then rephrase questions one and four as follows:
(la) what is the manner of unity of a being endowed with a
true unity;
(4a) can the statement that the unity of such a being is
foundational of the reality of a being by aggregation be
successfully interpreted in terms of our answer to la?
Defining substantial unity as numerical oneness, the answer
to la is
(la) the manner of unity of a being endowed with a true
unity is numerical oneness.
Let us try to assess the meaning of this definition.
It cannot mean that each substance is numerically one thing,
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for to say this is to predicate numerical oneness of an
already present reality. As „e have seen, substantial
unity for Leibniz is identical with substantial being and
therefore, if the unity of a substance is said to be, for
Leibniz, its numerical oneness, his theory requires that
there is no already present reality to which this oneness
can be predicated.' if this definition of substantial unity
us to be in accord with this fundamental doctrine of Leib-
niz it must be understood to mean that substantial being
is identical with numerical oneness. That is, what the
definition must mean if it is to be Leibnizian is not that
substances are numerically one but that numerical oneness
is substance. It is difficult to see what such a statement
could possibly mean.
Let us now turn to question 4a.
(4a) The answer seems to be no. We have described a being
by aggregation as a being whose reality belongs to its dis-
tinct constituent substances. With respect to this de-
scription, it is difficult to see what it might mean to say
that numerical oneness can serve as the foundation, or
basis, or ground of the reality of such a being.
xurning to a materialistic definition of substantial
unity we should answer la as follows:
(la) The manner of unity of a being endowed with a true
unity is the indivisibility which is opposed to the divi-
sibility of a continuum.
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What definition la must mean if it is to be in accordance
wrth Leibniz's identification of substantial unity and sub-
stantial being is that the absence of the property of divi-
sibility into parts is identical with substantial being.
This statement seems to be meaningless.
Finally, in answer to question 4a on this definition
of substantial unity we should have to answer as follows:
(4a) The answer, again, seems to be no. The statement that
the absence of divisibility into parts can serve as the
foundation of that whose reality belongs to its distinct
constituent substances is incomprehensible.
We have now completed the expository analysis which
shows that Leibniz's understanding of the unity of the
monad is none other than the scholastic understanding of
it which is represented in the work of Thomas Aquinas and
also established by him with respect to those aspects of
his understanding given shape by his original doctrine of
the unicity of substantial form.
Unity and Phenomenality
In the previous section we noted that Leibniz's dis-
tinction between substantial being and being by aggregation
is based on their respective manners of unity. We said
that it is the unity of a substance, that is, its self-
identity, which prevents it from having its being through
aggregation in addition to having its being through itself.
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Similarly, we said,
gation, that is, its
it is the unity of a being by aggre-
numerical oneness, which prevents it
from having being through
being through aggregation.
itself in addition to having its
That is to say, these manners
of being are exclusive of one another and their mutual ex-
clusivity is implied by their respective manners of unity
.
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This mutual exclusivity is the basis of Leibniz's distinc-
tion between substantiality and phenomenality
,
and the un-
covering of this basis is an important result of our inves-
tigation into his doctrines of unity. We turn now to other
consequences which this investigation has for the inter-
pretation of his concept of phenomenality.
As his determination of the systematically decisive
moment of Plato's thought, Gottfried Martin writes:
If the Idea of beauty is supposed to have a
meaning then beautiful things must have
reality and being in some fashion. It is
therefore no longer possible that the Idea
alone should have being. But how is thebeing of Ideas related to the being of
sensible things?
. . . This is the ques-
tion Plato poses in the later dialogues, thequestion that brings forth metaphysics, andit is the same question that will define
metaphysics for all times
.
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According to Martin, the decisive moment of Plato's thought
emerges as the question: what manner of being can be as
signed to sensible things? That this is also the question
that "brings forth metaphysics" and that will "define meta-
physics for all times" is, perhaps, a debatable remark.
With respect to Leibniz's metaphysics, however, it is true
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that a main effort of his
wering this question.
thought was directed towards ans
Like Plato, Leibniz sought to confer some measure of
reality on sensible things, and determined their reality
through the concept of being by aggregation. He was thus
led to what has been called his "twofold plan of being"-
division of What is into what has substantial being
(namely, monads, and what has being by aggregation (namely,
~n°m'n
- f£Hde> - 50 m his Theodicy
, Leibniz refers
to these as "the realm of Grace" and "the realm of Na-
ture. This distinction into monadic being and phenom-
enal being is, however, only a first division of being;
under it are subsumed many subdivisions. In his letter to
Des Bosses of August 19, 1715, Leibniz appends a table
representing the two-fold plan and it will be useful to
have that table before us (see following page).
There is much that can be said about Leibniz's table;
indeed
,
a separate study of it could prove to be an impor-
tant contribution to Leibniz studies. For our purposes,
however, only a few remarks are necessary.
Firs u
,
we should note that phenomena (i.e., unities,
or beings by aggregation) are not imaginary; they are not
wholly devoid of reality. Rather, a phenomenon is to be
counted as "a permanent absolute creature." On the other
hand, that phenomena are not fully real is indicated by
the prefix 'semi' in 'semibeing' ( 'semiens
' ) , 'semisub-
•btoluM
Cft»tu'»>hk*
ihatton
a
neither
eetlvity-peu.Mty
not
relation,
hi
118
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i
fluid
pcnrcatinf
it.
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stance' ( '
) , and • semiaccident
' Csemi-
-cidens'). Second
, we should note that both semisub-
stances and semiaccidents are collections of
-full beings'
or realities which are unities through themselves. Semi-
substances are collections of substances (which substances
are unities through themselves) such as "the choir of an-
gels, an army of men, a herd of animals" and so on. Semi-
accidents are collections of the modifications of sub-
stances, and these latter are also unities through them-
selves. The table offers no examples of primary semi-
accidents, but does list colors, odors, and tastes as
secondary semiaccidents and this list is repeated in the
text of the latter to which the table is appended
.
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From these observations on the table, we may draw two
conclusions: first, for Leibniz, all phenomena are collec-
tions, and second, that which phenomena are collections of,
are fully real, that is, are "full beings." This first
conclusion presents us with a problem of interpretation:
what is meant by the statement that phenomena are collec-
tions? We may clarify this statement by asking: how do
aggregates come to be? Leibniz writes:
Our mind notices or conceives of genuine
substances which have various modes, these
modes embrace relationships with other sub-
stances from which the mind takes the oppor-
tunity to link them together in thought and
enter into account one name for all these
things together, which makes for convenience
in reasoning. But one must not let oneself
120
s arsKsuya-
timp
hS
^
±nd
'
and who conceive of number,
aia^: ^pc
Ce
' movement
^ shaPe ' Perceptible
c „qualities as so many beings by themselves
.
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Number, time, place, and so on are merely "abstractions
of the mind" and to suppose that the reality of, for ex-
mple, a herd 01 animals, or an army of men is the reality
of substance is, according to Leibniz, to make these ab-
stract concepts "beings by themselves." why is this so?
Let us recall Leibniz's example of the diamond of the
Grand Duke and that of the Grand Mogul. Placed in a single
ring, he says, they make up an unum per accidens
, for the
reason that "it is as though by accident that they are
forced into one and the same movement ." 55 The movement of
the diamond of the Grand Duke is related to the movement of
the diamond of the Grand Mogul in such a way that they are
one in respect of motion. What the two diamonds make up,
namely, one pair of diamonds, is, according to Leibniz, one
only by accident; and for the reason that it is by accident
that their movement is one. Here Leibniz makes an inference
from the character of the oneness in respect of which they
are one (i.e., their oneness of movement is accidental) to
the character of the oneness of what they constitute (i.e.,
they are one pair of diamonds by accident) . The inference
follows because he has identified the oneness of their move-
ment with the oneness of what they constitute, that is, one
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P r of diamonds. Recall that movement is one of the "ab-
stractions of the mind" which Leibniz mentions in the pas-
sage quoted just above.
In another example, Leibniz says that the union of a
Pile of stones is "a mere union of place; the Scholastics
call it an unum per accidens ." 56 The union of the pile of
stones is identical with a onenes
is
' the oneness of the pile is a
s in respect of place, that
oneness of place. Again,
note that place is another of the "abstractions of the mind
which Leibniz lists in the above quoted passage.
Generalizing from these examples we can say that, for
Leibniz, the oneness of a being by aggregation is a oneness
m respect of some abstract concept. Several stones, for
example, make up one pile by virtue of being thought
tnrough the abstract concept of place as being in one place
Since, as we have seen, Leibniz equates unity with being
even m the realm of being by aggregation
,
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it follows
that the oneness of that with respect to which several sub-
stances are thought to be one is identical with the being
of what is constituted by those substances. Also, the
unity of an aggregate is, as we have seen, numerical one-
5 8
ness. Thus, we should say that the numerical oneness of
the movement of the diamonds is identical with the being
of the pair of diamonds; the numerical oneness of the place
of several sheep is identical with the being of the flock
of sheep, and so on. Our use of the term 'concept 1 and
122
the coordinate term 'thought' in this context is not a
technical one and the terms should be understood as refer-
ring broadly to, respectively, any cognitive item and its
manner of exercise. Whether Leibniz would classify motion,
for example, as a perception, or as an apperception, or
possibly as a mental activity other than these is a question
beyond the scope of the present discussion.
We can now see why, for Leibniz, the statement that the
reality of, for example, a herd of animals, or an army of
men is the reality of substance has the implication that
number, place, time, and so on, are "beings by themselves."
His point is that the reality of the aggregate is also the
reality of that which constitutes the aggregate. Since the
aggregate is constituted by thinking its several constitu-
ents as one in respect of an abstract concept, it follows
that if the reality of the aggregate is substantial so too
is the abstract concept in respect of which its constitu-
ents are thought.
The reality assigned to the aggregate must be that
assigned to what constitutes the aggregate. It follows
that since the aggregate is constituted by a manner of
thinking its constituents (namely, by thinking them as one
in respect of an abstract concept)
,
the reality of the
aggregate is the reality of thought. Thus, to De Voider,
Leibniz wrote:
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thly any Sthefreali^ ^ mlnd ' nor ^
rowed, L what belong to'thfX^ b° r -
which they are compounded. 59
ngS of
And again to Des Bosses:
Aggregates themselves are nothing butphenomena for everything except the com-
from
n
th
m°nad iS added Perception alonee .very fact of their being simul-taneously perceived. 60
We have been saying that the reality of the aggregate
for Leibniz is the reality of thought. But what is meant
by the phrase 'the reality of thought'? in what sense may
thought be said to have reality? The following passages
from Leibniz's New Essays Concerning Human Understand^
serve to clarify the meaning of this statement. He writes
This unity of the idea of aggregates is
very true; but ultimately you must admitthat this collective unity is only a con-gruity or relation, whose ground is inthat which is found in each of the single
substances separately . 61
With respect to what we have said so far, we may in-
terpret Leibniz's statement that "this collective unity is
only a congruity or relation" as meaning that he under-
stands the various abstract concepts with respect to which
thought thinks the many as one as manners of relation. If
relation is thus constitutive of being by aggregation, then
the manner of reality proper to relation, if indeed rela-
tions have a manner of reality, will also be the manner of
reality of the aggregate. In the following passages, also
124
from the NewEssays, Leibni z speaks of the reality of rela-
tions and identifies the source of their reality.
bein^of
3 and orders have something of the
foonL?
reason
' although they have their
supreme
a
rea^on: 62
iUtieS
' “ ^om the
Again, he writes:
Still, although relations are from the
understanding, they are not without founda-
staSd^ rSaLitY - F°r the first under-tanding is the origin of things; and the
tio^of oT
er\° f aJ 1 thin9 s ' with the excep-
• ..
simple
. substances
, consists only
n the foundation of the perceptions ofphenomena of simple substances . 63
The reality of relation, for Leibniz, is, ultimately, the
reality of the "divine reason" or "first understanding."
In accordance with the problems we set for ourselves
m the previous chapter, we have in this chapter shown what
Leibniz's reasons were for introducing the scholastic doc-
trine of substantial forms into post-Cartesian thought.
Also, we have explicated his analysis of the unity of being
m itself as it is framed in the general argument of which
his argument against the Cartesian view that extension is
the essence of bodily substance is but a special case. We
have seen that his analysis of the unity of being in itself
is precisely that analysis of it found in the work of Thomas
Aquinas, and that he adopts Aquinas' solution to the prob-
lem of accounting for the unity of substance by the doc-
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trine of the unicity of substantial form
. plnaUyf
on our analysis of unity and being by aggregation we are
able to determine what manner of reality Leibniz assigned
to sensible things. We have seen that the aggregate is
constituted by the thought which, in respect of some ab-
stract category, thinks the many as singly real. We also
saw that Leibniz may be understood to have subsumed these
various abstract concepts under the category of relation
and that the reality of relation, and so the reality of
what is constituted by relation, namely, aggregates, is
the reality of the divine reason.
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Thus, the relation obtaining between, on the one hand,
a property held in common by several substances in respect
of which they are one and, on the other, being an aggregation
(and so also accidental unity) parallels the relation obtain-ing between substantial form and substantial being (and so
also, unity in itself)
. That Leibniz so related this latter
pair has, of course, yet to be shown.
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chapter v
SOME RECENT INTERPRETATIONS
In this chapter we will consider the interpretations of
Leibniz's doctrine of the unity of substance as found in
Bertrand Russell's Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of
—
lbniZ and G ‘ H * R * Parkinson's Logic and Reality in Leib -
niz 's Metaphysic s. We will show that neither has correctly
interpreted this doctrine. According to Russell, substan-
tial unity for Leibniz is numerical oneness. And according
to Parkinson, substances are indivisible (i.e., unities)
for Leibniz in the sense of 'indivisible' which is the con-
trary opposite of the sense of 'divisible' in which a con-
tinuum may be said to be divisible. We have seen that both
of these interpretations of substantial unity for Leibniz
are incorrect.
According to Russell, the premises of Leibniz's philos-
ophy are inconsistent. By his own statement, this charge of
inconsistency constitutes the distinctively critical char-
acter of his book. We will show that this charge is based
on his misinterpretation of Leibniz's doctrine of substan-
tial unity and that, therefore, Russell failed to establish
it. According to Parkinson, Leibniz cannot be interpreted
as trying to deduce the doctrine of the indivisibility of
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substances from his logical doctrine that every substance
has a complete concept. His endeavor to show this is di-
rected against the assertion made by Russell in his above-
mentl°ned
—
tical E*P°si tAgn, and shortly thereafter by
Louis couturat in his La^Logiaue de Leibniz
. We win show
that Parkinson fails to establish his thesis with respect
to Leibniz 's doctrine of the indivisibility of substances
preexsely because he has misinterpreted that doctrine. In
showing this it is not our intention to be giving support
to the Russell-Couturat thesis, but simply to deny that
Parkinson has shown that thesis to be false with respect to
Lexbniz
' s doctrine of the unity of substance. For us,
Leibniz's statement that every substance has a complete
concept is merely the logical side of the ontological state-
ment that every substance has its being undividedly. For
it to be shown that he derived one of these statements from
the other it would first have to be shown that they are not
logically equivalent statements. In what follows, we shall
briefly argue that they are.
Let us begin by collecting some of the expressions
which Leibniz uses to denote unity as a transcendental
property of being. He uses the expression ’truly one'
(
1 vertiablement un 1 ) in the sentence: "What is not truly
one being is not truly one being either "; 1 'unity' ('unum')
in the sentence: "Being and unity are convertible "; 2
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'true one' Cvere unum') in the sentence: "if there were
no true one every true being would be eliminated '; 3
'a true unity' Cune vertiable unite ') in the sentence:
"Every being by aggregation presupposes beings endowed with
a true unity "; 4
'indivisible' (' indivisible ') in the sen-
tence:
"Substantial unity calls for a thoroughly indivis-
ible being '-; 5
'simple' (' simple ') and 'without parts'
('sans parties ') in the sentence: "The monad, of which we
shall here speak, is nothing else than a simple substance,
which enters into composites; simple, that is to say, with-
out parts ." 6 All of these passages are well known and may
be presumed to be familiar to Russell and Parkinson.
Therefore, we will understand an interpretation of what
Leibniz means when he says, for example, that substances
are indivisible, to apply equally to what he means when he
says that substances are simple, without parts, truly one,
etc
.
Bertrand Russell's Critical Exposition of the Philos -
ophy of
_
Leibniz is, as the title indicates, both an exposi-
tion of Leibniz's philosophy as well as a critique of his
philosophy as so explicated. While critical comments on
Leibniz's philosophy are scattered throughout the book, its
distinctively critical character is given to it by a single
argument which Russell develops throughout its first half.
We will show that this argument of Russell's depends, in a
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fundamental way, upon a misinterpretation of Leibniz’s doc-
trine that substances are unities. Russell understands
this doctrine to mean that each substance is numerically
one, and as we have shown in the previous chapter, this is
a mistaken interpretation. With the correction of this
interpretative error, Russell’s major critical argument
collapses
.
As was said above, Russell develops the critical argu-
ment of his book throughout its first half, and his identi-
fying references as to what this argument is and what its
decisive meaning is for Leibniz's philosophy are similarly
spread out over this portion of the work. So that there
will be no question regarding our identification of this
argument or of our understanding of its significance for
Russell s critique, we shall begin by tying together the
more unambiguous of these references.
In his preface to the second edition, Russell writes:
[It] is argued in the following pages [that]
the subject-predicate logic, taken strictly
as Leibniz took it, is incompatible with
plurality of substances.
7
This remark must be coordinated with the fuller statement
of the inconsistency he finds in Leibniz's philosophy as
presented in the first chapter. There he writes:
The principal premises of Leibniz's philosophy
appear to me to be five. . . . The premises
in question are as follows:
I.
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Every proposition has a subject and apredicate. ...
IV. The Ego is a substance.
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The inconsistency which Russell speak of in his preface
to the second edition as obtaining between Leibniz's logical
doctrines and the assertion that there is a plurality of
substances is part of an inconsistency which he speaks of
m the present passage as obtaining among the three listed
premises of Leibniz's philosophy. From this we may surmise
that Russell takes the statement that there is a plurality
of substances to be logically equivalent to what is implied
by his Roman numeral (V), namely, that there is an external
world, that is, as he says, "existents other than myself
and my states." it is important for our purpose of showing
that Russell's major critical argument against Leibniz
collapses that there be no question that he does take these
statements to be logically equivalent. We will show that
he does on the basis of a reconstruction of his statement
of a dilemma which, he says, shows the inconsistency of
the three premises of Leibniz's philosophy which he lists
in the above quoted passage. This reconstruction will be
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made below. For present purposes, it is enough that our
assertion be noted that Russell takes as logically equiva-
lent the statements: (a) there is a plurality of sub-
stances and, (B) there is an external world.
We mentioned above that Russell shows the purported
inconsistency of the three premises of Leibniz's philosophy
listed m the above quoted passage by means of a dilemma
into which, he says, Leibniz's philosophy falls. One half,
or 'horn,' of this dilemma involves his argument to show
that by denying that there is a plurality of substances,
Leibniz is enabled to provide a paradox free solution to
the problem of the composition of the continuum. The
second half of the dilemma is the statement: if Leibniz
denied that there is a plurality of substances, then, for
Leibniz, there is no external world.
Our critique of Russell's dilemma will proceed as
follows. First we will establish that Russell does not show
that Leibniz's denial of a plurality of substances enables
him to provide a paradox free solution to the problem of
the composition of the continuum. Russell does not show
this, as we shall see, precisely because Leibniz never
denied that there is a plurality of substances in the way
Russell interprets him to have done so. Now, the other
half of Russell's dilemma is: if Leibniz held that there
is a plurality of substances, then his solution to the
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continuum problem falls into paradox. Since Russell fails
to show that, on the contrary assumption, Leibniz did pro-
vide a paradox free solution to the continuum problem, he
is left saying that Leibniz failed to provide this solution
since such a solution is logically impossible. This, how-
ever, can hardly be taken as a criticism of Leibniz. We
turn then to Russell's argument to show that Leibniz's de-
nial of a plurality of substances enabled him to provide a
paradox free solution to the problem of the continuum.
Russell says that Leibniz professed "to deduce the
existence and nature of monads largely from the need of
explaining the continuum." 9 According to his reconstruc-
tion, the purported deduction has as its conclusion:
If the reality of what appears to be matter
is to be saved, this must consist of an
infinite plurality of indivisible sub-
stances
.
10
According to Russell, this conclusion is problematic inas-
much as "infinite number is self-contradictory, and we can-
not be content with the assertion that there is an infinite
number of monads."'*' 1 However, says Russell, this problem
is not fatal to Leibniz's thought since he was able to
evade it. In his account of how Leibniz evaded the conclu-
sion that there is an infinite number of monads, Russell
interprets the doctrine of the unity of being to mean that
each monad is numerically one. The following passage con-
tains this account.
138
To evade the argument, Leibniz makes a verybole use of his principle that, in concretesthe part is prior to the whole, and that nothing
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11 soon be evident, completely destroy thepossibility of a plurality of substances.
Leibniz s position is this: that the notion
of a whole can only be applied to what is sub-
stantially indivisible. Whatever is real about
an aggregate is only the reality of its con-
stituents taken one at a time; the unity of a
collection is what Leibniz calls semi
-mental,
and therefore the collection is phenomenal
although its constituents are all real. Oneis the only number that is applicable to ^hatis real, since any other number implies parts,
and aggregates, like relations, are not 'realbeings
. This explains how infinite number
can be denied, while the actual infinite is
admitted.
. . . One whole must be one sub-
stance, and to what is not one whole, number
cannot properly be applied. 12
Early in the passage Russell refers to Leibniz's
statement that being and unity are convertible terms. The
oubseguent account of how Leibniz sought to affirm the
actual infinite while denying infinite number shows chat
he understands this statement to mean that the unity of
being is numerical oneness. This is as follows.
According to Russell, Leibniz sought to show that the
number one is the only number which is applicable to the
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real. By showing this, says Russell, Leibniz may admit the
actual infinite while denying infinite number. Russell
writes that "one is the only number that is applicable to
wnat is real, since any other number implies parts, and ag-
gregates, like relations, are not "real beings. 1,13 His
point is that to say of a reality that it is two implies
than it nas parts, and so is an aggregate. This is so since
to predicate twoness of a reality implies that the reality
has constituent substantial parts; for each of the numeri-
cal ones contained in the predication of the twoness must
apply to a substantial being. Consequently, only the num-
ber one can be predicated of what is real. Russell's
tnought seems to be that in this way Leibniz can affirm the
actual infinite while denying infinite number since to enu-
merate is to predicate twoness, threeness, etc., of reality.
By this argument, according to Russell, the possibility
or a plurality of substances is completely destroyed. On
the basis of our investigations into Leibniz's analysis of
substantial unity which snow chat, for him, the unity of a
substance is the undividedness of its being, we may remark
as follows: assuming with Russell that Leibniz did hold
that there is a plurality of substances, he certainly was
not led into inconsistency for the reason that he also held
that the number one is the only number applicable to being
in itself. Indeed, as we have also seen, for Leibniz, nu-
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merical oneness is the distinctive mark of the phenomenal.
We have yet to reach the major critical statement of
Russell's book, though the critique he has developed at this
point in his exposition, namely, that Leibniz was forced
either to deny that there is a plurality of substances or
to admit that there are an infinite number of them, is an
important part of that statement. Let us continue then
with Russell's exposition.
Russell acknowledges that while the statement that one
is the only number applicable to what is real is "a legiti-
mate deduction from the theory that all propositions are
to be reduced to the subject predicate form," the statement
that there is a plurality of substances "is not of this
form it does not assign predicates to a substance." "Ac-
cordingly," he continues, "Leibniz takes refuge, like many
later philosophers, in the mind." 14 He explains his mean-
ing in the following passage:
Thus the truth in the judgment of plurality
is reduced to a judgment as to the state of
every monad which perceives the plurality. 15
Stating that he will forego criticism of this determination
until a later time, he proceeds as follows:
For the present, it is enough to place a
dilemma before Leibniz. If the plurality
lies only in the percipient, there cannot
be many percipients, and thus the whole doc-
trine of monads collapses. If the plurality
lies not only in the percipient, then there
is a proposition not reducible to the subject-
14 ]
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Russell identifies this dilemma as being a direct result of
the allegedly inconsistent triad of statements which he pre
sents in his first chapter as among the principle premises
of Leibniz's philosophy. He writes:
Ihe dilemma in which Leibniz is placed, is adirect result of the combination of threepremises, which, as I asserted in Ch. I. (n.are hopelessly inconsistent. These threepremises are (1) that all propositions have
a subject and a predicate, (2) that perceptiongives knowledge of a world not myself or mypredicates, (3) that the Ego is an ultimatelogical subject. 17
4)
,
We turn now to the question of whether Leibniz's philosophy
does in fact fall into this dilemma.
Let us begin with the half which draws consequences
from the assumption that plurality for Leibniz lies not only
m the percipient. From this Russell draws three conse-
quences, one of v/hich is that Leibniz failed to provide a
paradox free solution to the problem of the composition of
the continuum. As we have just seen, Russell has not shown
that Leibniz did provide a paradox free solution to the
continuum problem by denying the contrary assumption.
Russell has not shown this because he interprets Leibniz's
denial of a plurality of substances to mean that Leibniz
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held that the number one is the only number which is appli-
cable to reality. But it is false that Leibniz held this,
and so Russell has not shown that Leibniz provided a para-
dox free solution to the continuum problem since this is
the only argument by which he tries to show this. Conse-
quently, for all Russell has shown, it might nevertheless
be true that Leibniz denied that there is a plurality of
substances in some other way, i.e., other than by holding
that the number one is the only number applicable to real-
ity, and still did. not provide a paradox free solution to
the continuum problem. But if this is admitted as true,
then, together with Russell's statement that if Leibniz
affirmed the plurality of substances he did not provide a
paradox free solution to the continuum problem, it follows
that it is a logical truth that Leibniz failed to solve
the continuum problem. This can be so only if it is logi-
cally impossible to solve it. Leibniz can hardly be cri-
ticized for having failed to solve what cannot logically
be solved; however
,
Russell cannot show that this is not
what he is presenting as a criticism of Leibniz.
Let us turn now to the remaining half of Russell's
dilemma, namely, that if Leibniz denied that there is a
plurality of substances, then he denied that there are
many substances.
We noted earlier that in his preface to the second
edition, Russell speaks of an inconsistency obtaining
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between Leibniz's logical doctrines and the assertion that
there is a plurality of substances. This inconsistency,
we said, is part of the inconsistency which he alleges to
obtain among three premises of Leibniz's philosophy. These
three premises are listed in the above quoted passage and
in a similar passage we quoted earlier. Since the state-
ment that there is a plurality of substances does not oc-
cur on this list but, rather, the statement that there is
an external world, we surmised that Russell took these
statements to be logically equivalent. This interpreta-
tion of Russell's meaning can be established as follows.
If Russell is not taking these statements to be
equivalent, one cannot understand how the first premise
of his dilemma, namely, "if the plurality lies only in the
percipient, then there cannot be many percipients" 18 can
runction as part of an argument to show that the three
principal premises are inconsistent. Thus, we understand
the dilemma to show the inconsistency of the triad as
follows
:
(a) If the plurality lies only in the percipient,
then it is false that perception gives knowledge
of a world not myself or my predicates (i.e.,
[2] is false)
.
(b) If the plurality lies not only in the percipient,
then it is false that all propositions have a
14 4
subject and a predicate (i.e., [1] is false).
(c) If it is false that all propositions have a sub-
ject and a predicate, then it is false that the
Ego is the ultimate logical subject (i.e., not
[1] implies not [3] )
.
(Thus, Russell says, "then
there is a proposition not reducible to subject-
predicate form, the basis of the use of sub-
stance has fallen through." 19 His point is that
the statement that the Ego is the logical subject
is based upon the statement that all propositions
can be reduced to subject-predicate form.)
(d) If the plurality lies not only in the percipient,
then it is false that the Ego is the logical sub-
ject, (from [b] and [c] above)
.
From (a) - (d) it can be easily shown that at least one
member of the triad is false.
For Russell, then, the following statements are
logically equivalent:
(A) If the plurality lies only in the percipient,
then there cannot be many percipients; and
(B) If the plurality lies only in the percipient,
then it is false that there is an external world.
Of course, (A) is trivially true, but it is (B) that Rus-
sell must establish in order to show that three of Leib-
niz's premises form an inconsistent triad. In what fol-
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ows, we will provide a Leibnizian defense of the denial
of (B); that is, we will show that Leibniz can maintain
that plurality lies only in the percipient and also that
there is an external world. The argument we will develop
emerges out of our exposition of Leibniz's analysis of the
unity of substance.
Before we proceed, a preliminary remark is in order.
Russell does not provide a clarification of what he means
by the phrase "an external world," and so must be suppos-
ing that the ordinary sense commonly attached to these
worcs is sufficiently clear for the purpose of making his
argument. In this connection, it should be recalled that
the expression was originally formulated by early analytic
philosophers for its common sense value in their arguments
against the British neo-Hegelians (cf. the title, "Proof
of an External World," by the common sense philosopher G.
E. Moore, and, of course, Russell's own Our Knowledge of
the External World ) . Therefore, for the purpose of argu-
ment against Russell's statement that, for Leibniz, if
plurality lies only in the percipient, then there is no
external world, the phrase "an external world" can be used
with its ordinary meaning.
Let us begin by asking the following question: why
does Russell suppose that the assertion that there are
many percipients is the logical equivalent of the state-
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ment that there is an external world, or, as he says,
"existents other than myself"? 20 These are equivalent
only on the assumption that what is other than myself is
distinguished as such, i.e.
,
as other, in virtue of our
numerical distinctness with respect to each other. In
general, the above two statements are equivalent only on
the assumption that number is the principle of the diver-
sification of the real. For Leibniz, however, as we have
seen, numerical oneness is the distinctive mark of the
phenomenal, and number in general is an abstract concept
with respect to which thought thinks diverse substances
as singly real. What then, for Leibniz, is the principle
of diversity with respect to the substantial? We have
answered this question in the context of our description
of being by aggregation. For Leibniz, we said, to have
being by aggregation is to have the being of distinct sub-
stances, using 'distinct" to refer to non-identity. Since
we have explicated this idea in Leibniz by analysis of key
passages from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, it may be
helpful to again cite what, for present purposes, is the
most relevant of these passages. Thus:
Now the division which is implied in the notion
of the kind of unity which is interchangeable
with being is not the division of continuous
quantity, which is understood prior to that
kind of unity which is the basis of number,
but is the division which is caused by con-
tradiction, inasmuch as two particular beings
are said to be divided by reason of the fact
that this being is not that being. 21
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Fo it Aquinas
, the s ub^ _do tantial is numerically diverse,
but numerical diversity is not the principle which gives'
rise to the diversity among substances. That principle,
rather, is the principle of non-contradiction. That is to
say, what makes substances to be
their necessary non-identity. As
Leibniz maintained that substance
adverse
, for Aquinas, is
differing from Aquinas,
is exclusively form.
Thus, for him, substances are distinct only in the sense
of being non-identical. The diversity of the substantial
is not for him a numerical diversity, nor are substances
even diverse in the manner of numerical distinctness in
addition to being diverse in the manner of being non-iden
tical. Numerical oneness for Leibniz is, as we have seen
the manner of unity appropriate to phenomena. We may add
that it is also for him the principle of the diversity
with respect to the phenomenal.
Since, for Leibniz, substances are distinct only in
the sense of being non-identical, it is possible for him
to maintain that plurality lies only in the percipient and
also that there is an external world. Hence, the state-
ment: if Leibniz maintained that plurality lies only in
the percipient, then he could not also have maintained
that there is an external world, which is one half of
Russell's dilemma, is false. Since one half of the dilem-
ma is false, the dilemma collapses and consequently Rus-
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sell has not by this argument shown that Leibniz's prem-
ises are inconsistent. As he offers no other argument in
support of the charge of inconsistency, we can conclude
that the charge is not established by his work.
The remaining half of Russell's dilemma is the state-
ment that if Leibniz affirmed the plurality of substances,
then he did not provide a paradox free solution to the
continuum problem. With respect to this statement we had
the following to say. We supposed for the sake of the
dilemma that at some point in his career Leibniz affirmed
the plurality of substances. We saw that Russell fails to
show that Leibniz ever did provide a paradox free solution
to that proolem on the basis of the contrary assumption,
that is, on the basis of the assumption that there is no
plurality of substances. Russell fails to show this, we
said, because he interprets Leibniz's denial of a plural-
ity of substances to mean that he held that the number one
is the only number applicable to reality and, we said,
Leibniz never held this. From this we concluded that
Russell cannot show that he is not merely asserting that
Leibniz failed to provide a paradox free solution to the
continuum problem because it is logically impossible to
do so. And this, we said, can hardly be offered as a
criticism of Leibniz.
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We turn now to G. K. R. Parkinson's interpretation of
Leibniz's doctrine of
tation is presented in
Metaphysics
.
substantial unity as that interpre-
hls Loglc and Reality in Leibniz's
Parkinson presents his interpretation of Leibniz's
doctrine of the unity of substance in the form of a com-
mentary on paragraph IX of the Discourse on
There Leibniz lists several statements which he alleges to
follow from the two statements: (1) that every substance
has a complete concept; and (2) that every substance ex-
presses the whole universe. One of the statements which
he alleges to follow from these is that "a substance can-
not be divided into two nor can one be made out of two." 22
His point is that one substance cannot be divided into two
substances nor can one substance be made out of two sub-
stances
.
According to Leibniz, the statement (1) above that
every substance has a complete concept is a consequence of
his intentional theory of the proposition. 23 This theory
states that all propositions are of the subject-predicate
, 24
rorm and that in every true affirmative proposition, the
concept of the predicate, or some component part of it, is
contained in the concept of the subject ('contained in' in
the sense of naving all component concepts in common)
;
while in every true negative categorical proposition, the
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concept of the predicate, of some component part of it, is
excluded from the concept of the subject ('excluded from'
m the sense of having no component concepts in common). 25
Completeness for concepts may be defined as follows: the
concept of a substance is complete if and only if (i) it
analytically contains the totality of what may be truly
predicated of the substance in question and, (2) it anal-
ytically excludes whatever is not contained in it in the
sense tnat the addition of what is not already contained
m it would render the concept inconsistent. It follows
from this that complete concepts are distinct from one
another m the sense of being necessarily non-identical.
The manner of distinctness which obtains among complete
concepts is thus precisely the manner of distinctness
which obtains between substances. With respect to com-
plete concepts, this manner of distinctness emerges from
their completeness; with respect to substances it emerges
from the undividedness of their being. That is, a concept
is complete in the sense that it cannot be both a concept
of this substance and also a concept of that substance.
Similarly, a substance has its being undivedly in the
sense that its being does not belong both to it as well
as to what is other than it. Thus, completeness of con-
cept and undividedness of being for Leibniz are different
sides of one and the same coin.
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With regard to Leibniz's statement in the above iden-
tified passage of the Discourse on Metaphysics that the
indivisibility of a substance follows from the completeness
of its concept, Parkinson writes:
Leibniz does not make clear how he thinks theindivisibility of a substance follows from the
completeness of its concept. He might be
arguing from the premise that the concept of
a substance is indivisible, in the sense thatto remove from it one or more of its component
concepts would make it incomplete and so the
concept of an abstraction, not that of a sub-
stance. Given Leibniz's views about the con-
cept of a substance, the premise is sound; on
ohe other hand, no inference can be made from
the indivisibility of a concept to the in-divisibility of the substance of which it is
a concept. For example, it is part of the
complete concept of Lord Nelson that he lost
an arm in battle; now the complete concept of
Lord Nelson may be complete in the sense just
explained but it does not follow from this
that Nelson did not lose an arm. 26
Parkinson goes on to suggest what premises must be added
for uhe conclusion to follow validly; however, before we
turn to his suggestion, it will be instructive to consider
what he has said thus far. That the indivisibility of
Lord Nelson's concept is compatible with his loss of an
arm will not serve to show that the indivisibility of his
concept is compatible with his division into two substances
unless we take the severance of Lord Nelson's arm from his
shoulder as an example of what Leibniz means by the divi-
sion of one substance into two substances. Evidently
then, it is Parkinson's intention that we suppose that by
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the severing of Lord Nelson's arm from his shoulder, one
substance. Lord Nelson, has been divided into two sub-
stances, presumably. Lord Nelson and Lord Nelson's arm.
How, does Parkinson's example illustrate what Leibniz
means when he speaks of the division of one substance into
two substances? On the basis of our researches in the
previous chapter, the answer is that it does not.
Before we review the material supporting this criti-
cism, we should see that we are able to undermine Parkin-
son's interpretation without appealing to our own. What-
ever else Leibniz might have meant by saying that no sub-
stance can be divided into two substances, at least part
of what he meant was that it cannot both be true that some
thing is a substance and also true that it is logically
possible for that thing to be divided. Now, the substance
which is Lord Nelson-wi th-arm is Lord Nelson, and thus,
unless we are to suppose (what is plainly false) that Lord
Nelson is destroyed by the severance of his arm from his
shoulder, we must suppose that the substance which is
Lord Nelson-wi thout-arm is also Lord Nelson. It follows
from this that, at one time, there existed a substance,
namely. Lord Nelson (without arm) identical with a sub-
stance which, at a previous time, had actually been di-
vided, namely, Lord Nelson (with arm). And this, in turn,
implies that it can both be true that something is a sub-
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stance and also true that it is logically possible for
that thing to be divided. Hence, Parkinson's example of
the severance of Lord Nelson's arm from his shoulder does
not illustrate what Leibniz means by the division of one
substance into two substances.
Let us now turn to Parkinson's suggestion about what
premises must be added to the proposition that every sub-
stance has a complete concept in order for the conclusion
that every substance is indivisible to follow validly.
He writes:
It may be
. true
, however, that Leibniz's arqu-
menl is different, and that it rests not only
upon the assumption that a concept of a sub-
stance is complete but also on the assumptionLnaf every substance is connected witli all
ol Ikm substances, so that it expresses the
whole universe. The argument would then bethat if it were divided, a substance would
not express the whole universe, which it must
However
,
as Parkinson is quick to point out:
This argument assumes that a substance is
economically constructed; that is, that there
is no more in the substance than is necessary
to express the whole universe. This can only
be justified by an appeal to the principle of
the best, which is a non-logical principle.
Leibniz might reply that a substance could
not contain more than it does; it has to ex-
press an infinite universe, and so must be
of infinite complexity. This, however, does
not get rid of the need for the principle of
the best, since it is from this principle
that Leibniz derives the view that there must
be an infinity of substances . 28
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Since the presuppositions of the argument are irrelevant to
tne critical point we will develop, it suffices that we con-
sider it in the enthymematic form in which it is present in
the passage before us
.
Let us begin by noting that for Leibniz, the complete
concept of an individual substance must be a possible con-
cept, that is, such a concept may not contain incompatible
component concepts. Keeping this in mind, let us return
to Parkinson's Lord Nelson example. Suppose then that it is
part of the complete concept of Lord Nelson that he lost an
arm in a certain battle. Since Lord Nelson's concept must
be a possible one, it cannot also be part of his concept
that he had both arms after the battle. But if this is
true, then it cannot also be true that Lord Nelson is in-
divisible in the sense in which Parkinson is using 'indi-
visible. ' For in whatever that sense is, it evidently fol-
lows from saying that Lord Nelson is indivisible in that
sense that his arm was never severed from his shoulder.
From wnich it follows that Lord Nelson had both arms after
the battle. But, as we have seen, to say that Lord Nelson's
concept is complete is just to say that whatever may be
truly predicated of him is part of his concept. It must
therefore be part of Lord Nelson's concept that he had both
arms after the battle, and this contradicts our assumption
that his concept is a possible one. If Lord Nelson is in-
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divisible in Parkinson's sense, then it cannot be true that
both his concept is complete and also that his concept is
possible; which is just to say that if his concept is both
complete and possible, then he is not indivisible in Park-
inson's sense. Thus, given the sense in which Parkinson
supposes Leibniz to be using 'indivisible,' it is impossible
to construct a valid Leibnizian argument for the conclusion
that every substance is indivisible which includes among its
premises the proposition that every substance has a complete
concept
.
We have seen that Parkinson intends his example of the
severance of Lord Nelson's arm from his shoulder to illus-
trate what Leibniz means when he speaks of the division of
one subo Lance into two substances. The sense of 'divisible'
in which Lord Nelson's arm may be said to be divisible from
his shoulder is none other than the sense in which a con-
tinuum may be said to be divisible. Evidently then, it is
Parkinson's view that, for Leibniz, the indivisibility of a
substance is the indivisibility opposed to the divisibility
of a continuum. That this is his view is also evident from
his discussion of the problem of the composition of con-
tinuum. He writes:
The problem of the labyrinth of the continuum
[is this]. We are aware of what is continuous,
such as extension and duration; further, any-
thing continuous is infinitely divisible, in
the sense that, however small a segment of
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time or space we take, we can always conceive
claims
S
thal
1Sr
' We alS° know
' Leibniz
if thi
any substance must be indivisible-
it'must be
a
bnM a
anCe
-
iS really continuous
divisible! 30°
Ch lndlVlslble infinitely
Parkinson could not have believed himself to have de-
scribed a problem unless he believed that the proposition
that such and such a substance is indivisible is incompat-
ible with the proposition that it is infinitely divisible
m the sense that no matter how small a part we conceive,
a smaller part is always conceivable. if we suppose that
tor him, to say of a substance that it is indivisible is
the same as to say that it is a least conceivable part,
‘'hen
,
in fact, these proposition are incompatible. How-
ever, it is difficult to see how it might be said that Lord
Nelson is indivisible in this sense since no matter what
part of him we take, we can always conceive of a smaller
one. At best, Parkinson can say that though infinitely
divisible in the sense defined, Lord Nelson cannot actually
be divided beyond what is accounted for in his complete
concept; that is, while it is part of his complete concept
that ne lost his right arm in battle, it is not part of his
concept that he also lost his left arm, and so his left arm
cannot be severed from his shoulder. But if this is Park-
inson's meaning, then obviously, the proposition that such
and such a substance is indivisible is not incompatible
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with the proposition that it is infinitely divisible.
Pernaps our difficulties stem from trying to infer
Parkinson's sense of 'indivisible' from the definition he
gives of infinitely divisible.
' We might suppose that the
note of conceivability is introduced in order to explain
how a continuum may be said to be infinitely divisible.
Conceptually, we may say, the continuum is infinitely di-
visible but actually, it would seem, it is only finitely
so. Perhaps, then, Parkinson should have said that a con-
tinuum is divisible just in case it is actually distribu-
table into parts smaller than it. Continua not actually
distributable into smaller parts are conceptually distribu-
table into smaller parts. While all continua are infinitely
divisible, only some are actually divisible. We might say,
then, that a continuum is divisible just in case either it
is actually Distributable into smaller parts or conceptu-
ally distributable into smaller parts. With this, it ap-
pears open to Parkinson to say that a substance is indivis-
ible just in case either it is not actually distributable
into smaller parts beyond a certain point (e.g., beyond
loss of his right arm. Lord Nelson is not distributable
into smaller parts) or not conceptually distributable into
smaller parts. (These are incompatible as sub-contraries,
supposing it always true that a continuum is conceptually
distributable into smaller parts.) But this will not do
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either. For what is to be shown is that substances cannot
be continuous since what is continuous is divisible while
substances are indivisible. But, we have allowed that
something may be continuous without being actually distribu-
table into parts; that is, we have said that the continuous
is actually distributable into parts only up to a point.
We cannot say this and also say that substances are not con-
tinuous because they are indivisible in the sense that be-
yond a certain point they are not actually distributable
into parts
.
Perhaps we should understand Parkinson differently.
We have supposed his view to be that substances are indi-
visible in the sense that they cannot be actually distrib-
uted into parts beyond a certain point. So, for example,
we said that beyond the loss of his right arm. Lord Nelson
is not actually distributable into parts. Otherwise, he
seems to be saying, Lord Nelson would not be able to ex-
press the whole universe. In fact, however, this is not
Parkinson's view at all. For if it were his view that Lord
Nelson is indivisible in the sense that he cannot be dis-
tributed into parts beyond a certain point (viz., beyond
severance of his arm from his shoulder)
,
he would not have
used the severance of Lord Nelson's arm from his shoulder
as a counter-instance to Leibniz's claim that the indivis-
ibility of a substance follows from the completeness of its
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concept. For his argument is that though it is part of
L°rd Nelson ' s complete concept that he lost an arm in
battle
,
and though there is a sense in which his complete
concept may be said to be indivisible, it does not follow
that Lord Nelson did not lose an arm. Obviously, it is
Parkinson's view that because Lord Nelson lost an arm he is
not indivisible. As we have understood him, however, what
he should have said was not: "it does not follow from this
that Nelson did not lose an arm," but rather: "it does not
follow from this that Nelson lost nothing beyond his arm,"
and proceed to say what it was that Nelson lost because of
whicn he cannot be said to have been indivisible.
It is Parkinson's view that Lord Nelson cannot be
distributed into parts whatsoever; not that he cannot be
distributed into parts beyond what is accounted for in his
complete concept. But this implies that it is impossible
for Lord Nelson to have lost his arm, which is plainly
false, since, in fact, he did. Nevertheless, it seems
quite clear that it is Parkinson's view that substances are
indivisible in the sense of being incapable of actual dis-
tribution into any parts whatsoever. Does this definition
of 'indivisible' then help us to understand why Parkinson
thinks no substance can be continuous? Again, clearly not.
For as we have understood him, something may be continuous
without being actually distributable into parts. Hence,
16 0
to say that substances are indivisible in the sense of be-
ing incapable of actual distribution into any parts whatso-
ever is compatible with saying that they are continuous.
Thus far we have been unable to fit together an in-
telligible view from the pieces with which Parkinson has
provided us. However, there is a way in which this material
may be pieced together which captures what Parkinson may
have had in mind and is also intelligible.
According to Russell:
Everyone who has ever heard of Leibniz knows
that he believed in the actual infinite. Few
quotations from him are more familiar than the
following: 'I am so much in favor of the actual
infinite, that, instead of admitting that nature
abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that na-
ture affects it everywhere, in order to better
mark the perfections of its author. So I be-
lieve that there is no part of matter which is
not, I do not say divisible, but actually di-
vided; and consequently the least particle of
matter must be regarded as a world full of an
infinity of different creatures .' 31
Now, perhaps it is Parkinson's understanding that, for
Leibniz, not only matter but anything continuous is actually
infinitely divided. That he does so understand Leibniz is
suggested by the fact that he offers extension as an ex-
32
ample of something continuous. Supposing, as we may, that
he studied the present well known passage, he may have con-
cluded that since what is extended, namely, matter, is ac-
tually infinitely divided, it follows that what is continu-
ous is actually infinitely divided. (There is, of course,
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no incompatibility between saying that the continuous is
divisible in the sense of being actually infinitely dis-
tributable into parts, and saying that it is divisible in
the sense that no matter how small a part we take, a
smaller one is always conceivable.) Supposing this to be
Parkinson's understanding of the sense in which a contin-
uum is divisible, we can say that, according to him, sub-
stances are not continuous because they are indivisible in
the sense of being incapable of actual infinite distribu-
tion into parts; that is, beyond a certain point, sub-
stances are incapable of actual distribution into parts.
Ihis sense of 'indivisible' opens up for Parkinson
an account of what it means to say that Lord Nelson is in-
divisible which is both intelligible and incompatible with
saying that he is continuous. For it can now be said that
though Lord Nelson may be actually distributed into parts,
he may not be actually distributed into parts beyond a
certain point, that is, beyond what is accounted for in
his complete concept. Thus, while it is part of Lord Nel-
son's complete concept that he lost his right arm in
battle, it is not also part of his concept that he lost
his left arm in battle, nor, indeed, that any other part
of his body was severed from him. Beyond the loss of his
right arm (hair, fingernails, etc.) every part of his body
had at least one touching limit identical with some other
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until his death and for some considerable time afterwards.
However, since Lord Nelson is not actually distributable
into parts beyond a certain point, he is not actually in-
finitely distributable into parts and so is not continuous.
We did, of course, earlier conclude that it is Park-
inson's view that Lord Nelson is indivisible in the sense
of being incapable
-of actual distribution into any parts
whatsoever; not in the sense of being incapable of actual
distribution into parts beyond a certain point. While,
obviously, given this sense of 'indivisible,' it follows
from our definition of the divisibility of the continuum
that Lord Nelson is not continuous, we have elected to
33abandon it because of the flaw we noted earlier. Also,
we saw that it was necessary to provide a definition of
the divisibility of the continuum which differs from Park-
inson's. It must not be thought either that we are pre-
senting what we take to be Parkinson's real view, ignoring
thereby what he actually says. Rather, since on Parkin-
son's definitions, of substantial indivisibility and the
divisibility of the continuum, it is impossible to provide
an intelligible explanation of substantial indivisibility
and an explanation of why substances are not continuous,
we have provided an alternative pair of definitions which
accomplish these ends. This alternative pair of defini-
tions provides an account of substantial indivisibility
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which is like Parkinson's account in the fundamental re-
spect that substances are here said to be indivisible in
a sense opposed to the sense in which a continuum is said
to be divisible. Our aim has thus been to arrive at a
defensible version of Parkinson's basic position.
For us, of course, to say of a substance that it is
indivisible is the same as to say that it is simple, with-
out parts, truly one, etc. All of these terms denote unity
as a transcendental property of being. For Leibniz, it is
all the same to say that substantial being is convertible
with unity, that substances are indivisible, that they are
without parts, truly one, or that substances are a true
one, or a true unity (i.e., a substantial form). His
point is always that what has substantial being has being
which does not admit of distinction into what belongs to
it and what belongs to what is other than it.
That all of these terms have fundamentally the same
meaning is undisputed by Parkinson. He prefaces his ac-
count of Leibniz's derivation of the indivisibility of a
substance from the completeness of its concept with the
remark
:
In what follows . . . the statement that a
substance is indivisible will be taken as
equivalent to the statement that it is with-
out parts, that is, 'simple,' genuinely one,
a 'monad. ' 34
Since Parkinson does not offer an account of what it means
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to say that such and such a substance is without parts,
simple, etc., in addition to his account of what it means
to say that such and such a substance is indivisible, we
may assume that he takes these statements to be equivalent
since he takes the meanings of "x is without parts"; "x is
simple"; etc., to be fundamentally the same, i.e., that x
does not admit of division in the way in which a continuum
admits of division. However, once we see that, for sub-
stances, to be and to be indivisible are the same, we see
that we cannot identify the indivisibility of a substance
with the indivisibility which is opposed to the divisibil-
ity of a continuum. (We earlier drew this conclusion hav-
ing examined the identification in the light of Leibniz's
claim that substantial being is foundational of being by
35
aggregation.) " For, taking the definition of substan-
indivisibility which we drew from Parkinson's account,
the identification of substantial indivisibility with in-
capability for actual distribution into parts beyond a
certain point, (i.e., incapability for actual infinite
distribution into parts) does not leave us saying that
substances are incapable of actual infinite distribution.
Rather, it leaves us saying that incapability for actual
infinite distribution is what it is for substances to be.
That is, the being of a substance :Ls its incapability for
actual infinite distribution
— ,
and this, as we remarked
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earlier, is complete nonsense.
In this chapter we have determined how Russell and
Parkinson interpret Leibniz's doctrine of the unity of sub-
stance. We have seen that, according to Russell, substan-
tial unity for Leibniz is numerical oneness and that ac-
cording to Parkinson, substances are indivisible for Leib-
niz m the sense of 'indivisible' which is the contrary op-
posite of the sense in which a continuum may be said to be
divisible. As we si in the preceding chapter, both are
misinterpretations of Leibniz's doctrine. We also made a
critical evaluation of what Russell and Parkinson respec-
tively infer about Leibniz's philosophy on the basis of
these interpretations. In the case of Russell, we saw that
his interpretation of substantial unity for Leibniz as
numerical oneness is the basis of his charge that Leibniz's
premises are inconsistent. With the correction of this
misinterpretation, we showed that his argument does not
establisn this charge. In the case of Parkinson, we saw
that his interpretation of the indivisibility of substance
for Leibniz is the basis of his claim that Leibniz cannot
be interpreted as having attempted to deduce his doctrine
of the indivisibility of substance solely from his logical
doctrine that each substance has a complete concept.
Again, we showed that his argument does not establish
this claim.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation we have endeavored to provide an
interpretation of Leibniz's discussion of the problem of
unity. The importance of the concept of unity for Leibniz
is often noted by his commentators, however, neither his
analysis of this concept nor the systematic implications of
that analysis have been successfully understood. We sub-
stantiated this critical remark by our examination of the
work of Russell and Parkinson.
The central point of our interpretation is that Leibniz's
concept of substantial unity is precisely the concept of
transcendental unity to be found in that main current of
scholastic thought whose foremost representative was Thomas
Aquinas. The Thomistic analysis of the concept of trans-
cendental unity is hardly distinctive in scholastic tradi-
tion, and we could have equally well explicated this concept
by means of a survey of several traditions or by concentrat-
ing on a writer representative of a major tradition other
than Thomism; for example. Duns Scotus or William of Ockham.
We selected Aquinas since it is with reference to his origi-
nal doctrine of substantial form as the principle of unity
that we are able to explicate Leibniz's discussion of sub-
stantial form.
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When Leibniz speaks of substances as one, simple, without
parts, indivisible, true unities, etc. he is employing the
concept of transcendental unity. The unity of a substance
for him is the undividedness of it being. Since unity is
identical with being in re, substance for Leibniz is simply
undividedness of being. Alternatively stated, substance is
being always already undivided in its being. Leibniz's
thinking moves always in the sphere of a fundamental re-
flection on unity, and the scholastic understanding of unity
as a transcendental determination of being is the true file
d 1 Ariande running through the complexities of his system.
In chapter H, "The Scholastic Background" we explicated
Aquinas's concept of "the unity which is interchangeable
with being", that is, transcendental unity. As we saw, so
understood, "unity" does not express the concept of numeri-
cal oneness; rather, it expresses the concept which results
from the predicative addition of the concept of undivided-
ness to the concept of being. Stated otherwise, to be one
in this sense is to be undividedly. This indivision, we
saw, is not for Aquinas the indivision which is opposed to
the division of the continuum. Rather, the kind of divi-
sion to which transcendental unity is opposed is the kind
which obtains between two substances, namely, their
necessary non-identity. Such division Aquinas calls
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"division according to formal opposition". We defined
formal opposition" for Aquinas as "the occurrence of a
plurality of individual substantial forms in a single sub-
stance". Substantial form, we saw, is that which confers
determinate actuality on prime matter. Since, for a given
substance, the actuality of its prime matter is its esse, a
substance denominated by a plurality of substantial forms
would have a pluralized esse, that is, it would not be
identical with itself. We thus defined division according
to formal opposition as follows: two substances are divided
according to formal opposition if and only if the being which
would result were they identical possesses a plurality of
substantial forms. To say of a substance that it is trans-
cendentally undivided is to deny that the condition of its
being is the condition of the being of substances divided
according to formal opposition, that is, its identity with
itself does not result in its possessing a plurality of
substantial forms. In other words, to say of a substance
that it is undivided in this sense is to deny that the condi-
tion of its being is the condition of the being
of distinct, that is, non-identical, substances. Later, in
chapter IV
,
we saw that this analysis of transcendental
unity for Aquinas is precisely Leibniz’s understanding of
the unity of substance.
171
We began our exposition of Leibniz's analysis of the
concept of unity with an account of his critique of the
Cartesians and the Gassendists regarding their positions on
the composition of continuous substance. This account is
contained in chapter III, "Unity and the Continuum". Against
the Cartesians, Leibn-iz argued that the concept of a res
—
tensia is a self-contradictory one. According to Leibniz,
extension is constituted by the aggregation of parts, which
parts, since they are themselves extended, are in turn con-
stituted by the aggregation of parts, and so on ad infinitum
.
A whole, however, can have no more reality than what is
present in its parts. Since an extension is constituted by
infinitely many aggregate parts, the condition alone upon
which any part is real, namely, that its parts in turn be
real, cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, the concept of a
res extensia is a self-contradictory one. According to the
Gassendists, extended substance is composed of infinitely
hard, and so actually indivisible atoms. Against this view,
Leibniz argued that as long as such atoms are extended,
their division is not logically impossible, and, therefore,
they are merely aggregates. With this point established,
Leibniz's argument against the Gassendists proceeds along
the same lines as his argument against the Cartesians.
In these arguments against the Cartesians and the
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Gassendis ts
,
we saw an application of Leibniz's general
argument for the indivisibility of substance. Moreover,
insofar as the arguments show why, for Leibniz, matter cannot
be the principle of unity, they introduce us to his problem
of finding such a principle. It was to this end that he
revived the scholastic doctrine of substantial form. The
full exposition of Leibniz's doctrine of substantial indi-
visibility together with the doctrine of substantial form
as the principle of such indivisibility was presented in
sections (1) and (ii) of chapter iv , "Unity and Being".
Finally, our discussion of the problem of the composition of
continuous substance allowed for an examination of the con-
text in which Leibniz’s doctrine of substantial indivisibil-
ity can easily be misunderstood to refer to the kind of
indivisibility which is opposed to the divisibility of
continua. His objection to the positions of both the
Cartesians and the Gassendists appears to be that extension
is not indivisible in this way and therefore cannot be the
locus of substantiality. G. H. R. Parkinson interprets
Leibniz's doctrine of substantial indivisibility in this way
and in the final chapter "Some Recent Interpretations", we
showed that his reading cannot be maintained.
In chapter IV
,
"Unity and Being" we presented an exposi-
tory analysis of Leibniz's argument for the indivisibility
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of substance,
the Cartesians
His argument against the positions taken by
and the Gassendists over the question of the
composition of continuous substance is but
cation of this argument. Together with an
wide selection of the relevant texts, our
argument was the basis for our conclusion
a special appli-
examination of a
analysis of this
that the indi-
visibility, or unity, to which Leibniz continually refers
m his writings is precisely the unity which Aquinas referred
to as "the unity which is interchangeable with being".
In the first section of chapter IV, titled "Unity and
Bodies: The Issue in the Foreground", we traced the course
of Leibniz's discussion with Arnauld over the question of
the unity of bodily substance. According to Leibniz, if
bodies have substantiality then they must also have unity,
and the principle by which such unity is constituted is the
principle of substantial form. Alternatively, for Leibniz,
bodies might not be substances, in which case they are to
be regarded, according to him, as "beings by aggregation".
For Leibniz, all being is either as the being of a substance
or as the being of an aggregate. Since to be and to be one
are the same for Leibniz, his distinction between modes of
being is also a distinction between modes of unity -- a
consequence which he recognizes. He identifies the mode of
unity of a being by aggregation as numerical oneness in re-
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spect of a relation. That numerical oneness is the mode of
unity of a being by aggregation and not the mode of unity
of substantial being is an important point. We saw in the
final chapter, "Some Recent Interpretations" that Betrand
Russell interprets Leibniz to the contrary and that his
interpretation cannot- be maintained in view of the textual
evidence
.
In the second section of chapter iv, titled "The Monad
as Unum Transcendens" we presented our analysis of Leibniz's
statement that if there are no "beings endowed with a true
unity", that is, beings informed by a substantial form, or
simply, substances, then there will be no foundation for
the reality of beings by aggregation. This statement is
the heart of his argument for the indivisibility of sub-
stance. By explicating it we achieved an understanding of
the manner of reality possessed by substances, and on this
basis we were able to determine the meaning which the phrase
"a true unity" has for Leibniz.
Our analysis of the manner of reality possessed by sub-
stances was accomplished in two stages. The first stage
culminated in showing that in an ordinary sense of "undi-
vided" we may discern a common core of meaning between
Aquinas's sense of this word as he uses it to refer to the
unity of being, and a sense in which it is both natural and
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appropriate to describe the being of substance as undivided
being. We understood Leibniz's description of a being by
aggregation as a being "which obtains its reality from no-
where but that of its constituents" to mean that the reality
of such a being is divided among things other than itself.
Accordingly, we defined a substance as a being which has its
being undividedly and recalled Aquinas's statement that
'one' means undivided being".
In the second stage of our analysis of the mode of being
of substances, we determined that the fully articulated
Thomistic sense of "undivided" as the denial of "division
according to formal opposition" precisely describes sub-
stantial being for Leibniz. As a further articulation of
our description of being by aggregation we said that such a
being has the being of distinct substances; "distinct" mean-
ing non-identical. We next established that for Leibniz, to
say of a substance that it is self-identical is just to
deny that the condition of its being is the condition of the
being of distinct substances. This denial is also what
Aquinas means by saying that a substance has its being undi-
videdly. Since for Leibniz, the being of a substance is its
self-identity, it follows that substantial being is for
Leibniz what undividedness of being, unity, is for Aquinas.
And finally, since substantial being is substantial unity for
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Leibniz
,
we concluded that, for him, the unity of substance
is what Aquinas spoke of as undividedness of being.
In the third and final section of chapter IV, "Unity and
Phenomenality
" , we presented an analysis of Leibniz's con-
cept of a being by aggregation; what he otherwise calls a
"phenomene bien fonde 1'
. The question of how sensible things
have their reality is a perennial one, and Leibniz's answer
is. sensible things have their reality as aggregates or
substance'
. Our analysis was built around our determination
that the unity of a being by aggregation consists of its
numerical oneness. The numerical oneness of a being by
aggregation, we said, is the numerical oneness of the thought
which, with respect to some abstract concept such as time,
place, movement, and shape, thinks the many reals as singly
real. So, for example, several stones make up one pile by
virtue of being thought through the abstract concept of
place as being in one place. Since what constitutes the
unity of the aggregate is also that which constitutes its
reality, it follows, we said, that the reality of the aggre-
gate is the reality of thought.
We determined the meaning of the phrase "the reality of
thought" as follows. For Leibniz, we saw, the various
abstract concepts with respect to which thought thinks the
many as one are manners of relation. Relation is thus
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constitutive of being by aggregation, and so the manner of
reality of relations is the manner of reality of aggregates.
We saw next that, for Leibniz, the reality of relation is
the reality of the "divine reason" or "first understanding".
For Leibniz then, we concluded, the reality of sensible
things is the reality- of the divine thought.
In chapter V, "Some Recent Interpretations" we presented
a critical evaluation of the interpretations of Leibniz's
doctrine of the unity of a substance as found on Betrand
Russell's Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz
and G. H. R. Parkinson's Logic and Reality in Leibniz's
Metaphysics
.
As we saw, Russell interprets Leibniz's doctrine of the
unity of substance as the assertion that numerical oneness
and being are the same. In section one, "Unity and Being:
The Issue in the Foreground" we examined texts which show
clearly that, for Leibniz, substantial unity is not numeri-
cal oneness. Furthermore, in section two of that same
chapter, "The Monad as Unum Transcendens " we showed that
this interpretation of substantial unity for Leibniz cannot
be meaningfully put forward as an explication of his state-
ment that without substantial unity there is no foundation
for the reality of being by aggregation.
On the basis of his interpretation of substantial unity
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as numerical oneness, we saw that Russell charges Leibniz
with maintaining an inconsistent set of premisses. Russell
attempts to show this inconsistency by means of a dilemma
into which, he claims, Leibniz* s philosophy falls. This
charge of inconsistency is the major critical contribution
of Russell's book.
One half of Russell's dilemma is that if Leibniz held
that there is a plurality of substances, then his solution
to the continuum problem falls into paradox. Russell sup-
ports this statement with his argument that it was only by
denying that there is a plurality of substances that Leibniz
was enabled to provide a paradox-free solution to the con-
tinuum problem. We saw that Russell failed to show this
since Leibniz never denied that there is a plurality of
substances in the way in which Russell interprets him to
have done so, that is, by denying that there are numerically
many substances.
The first half of Russell's dilemma is that if Leibniz
affirm®d the plurality of substances, then he did not provide
a paradox-free solution to the continuum problem. Together
with his failure to show that, on the contrary assumption,
Leibniz did solve the continuum problem, it follows, we said,
that Russell cannot show that he is not presenting as a
criticism of Leibniz that he failed to solve the continuum
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problem because it is logically impossible to do so.
The second half of Russell’s dilemma is that if Leibniz
denied that there is a plurality of substances then he could
not also have maintained that there is an external world or,
as Russell puts it "existents other than myself”. For this
inference to follow, We said, it must be supposed that number
is the principle of the diversification of the real. For
Leibniz, however, the principle of the diversification of
tne real is the principle of non-contradiction. Since, for
Leibniz, substances are distinct only in the sense of being
necessarily non-identical, it is open to him to maintain that
there is no plurality of substances, plurality being merely a
phenomena, while still affirming that there is an external
world. We concluded that since one half of Russell's
dilemma is false, the dilemma collapses and consequently,
Russell has not by this argument shown that Leibniz's
premisses are inconsistent.
We next turned to G. H. R. Parkinson's interpretation of
Leibniz's doctrine of substantial unity as presented in his
Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics
. According to
Parkinson, we saw, substances are indivisible for Leibniz in
the sense of "indivisible” which is opposed to sense in which
the continuum may be said to be divisible. Upon analysis of
Parkinson's definitions of the indivisibility of substance
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and of the divisibility of the continuum, we found it
necessary to introduce definitions of our own in order to
have before us a defensible version of Parkinson's basic
position that these are opposing concepts for Leibniz. As
a Parkinsonian definition of the divisibility of the con-
tinuum, we suggested that the continuum might be said to be
divisible in the sense of being capable of actual infinite
distribution into parts. Accordingly, we suggested that
substances might be said to be indivisible in the sense of
being incapable of actual infinite distribution into parts.
In section two, "The Monad as Unum Transcendens " of
chapter IV
,
we showed that Leibniz's doctrine of the indi-
visibility of substance cannot be meaningfully interpreted
as the indivisibility which is opposed to the divisibility
of the continuum. As we saw, Leibniz identifies substantial
indivisibility with substantial being. In terms of our re-
construction of Parkinson's definition of substantial indi-
visibility, this identification leaves us saying that, for
Leibniz, substantiality is the incapacity for actual infinite
distribution into parts. This, we said, is a meaningless
statement. Furthermore, we saw that, for Leibniz, substan-
tial indivisibility is foundational of the reality of being
by aggregation, yet the statement that the incapacity for
actual infinite distribution into parts is foundational in
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this way is incomprehensible.
What follows now are some applications of our researches
into Leibniz's metaphysics both to the classical problem of
the self as well as to more recent concerns.
In the famous section "Of Personal Identity" in his
Treatise Of Human Nature
,
Huine writes:
The mind is a kind of theatre, where severalperceptions successively make their appear-
ance; pass
, re-pass
,
glide away, and minglem an infinite variety of postures and situ-
ations. There is properly no simplicity init at any one time, nor identity in different;
whatever natural propension we may have toimagine that simplicity and identity. The
comparison with the theatre must not mislead
us. They are the successive perceptions only,
that constitute the mind; nor have we the
most distant notion of the place, where these
scenes are represented, or of the materials,
of which it is compos'd.
Earlier in this same paragraph occurs Hume's well-known de-
scription of the self as "but a bundle or collection of
different perceptions". Leibnizians might reply to Hume's
description of the self as follows.
To begin, let us assume that Hume's point is that the
self has the reality of a collection and not the reality of
a substance. To this Leibniz would respond by arguing that
there must be simple substances whose reality provides the
foundation for the reality present in the collection and
that it is these simple substances which are selves. Were
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Hume to argue that the perceptions themselves provide the
foundation for this reality, Leibniz might respond by
arguing that perceptions are not simple but composed of
infinitely many lesser perceptions (petites perceptions )
.
3
However, even if Leibniz could establish this he would still
be left with the general problem of explaining how the
reality of simple substances can be foundational of the
reality of a collection of infinitely many parts. This prob-
lem is essentially the problem of the composition of the con-
tinuum, Leibniz's solution to which, as we noted above, is
of formidable complexity
.
4
Alternatively, Hume's point may not be that the reality
of the self is the reality of a collection but, rather, that
the self has no reality at all. For Leibniz, all reality is
as the reality of simple substances or has its foundation in
the reality of simple substances and hence, this denial is,
for him, the denial that anything is real. One might wish
Leibniz to respond with an argument to show that there are
simple substances, however, no such argument appears to be
in his writings. All Leibniz shows is that if there are
beings by aggregation then there must also be simple sub-
stances. So, for example, in the Monadology
,
he writes:
"there must be simple substances because there are composites;
for a composite is nothing else than a collection or
5
aggregatum of simple substances". Since the reality of an
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aggregate is for Leibniz just the reality of its substantial
foundation
,
the admission of being by aggregation is already
the admission of substantial reality. Against an opponent
who refused to concede substantial reality Leibniz apparently
has no argument. Were Hume thus to insist that the self never
is but is always coming to be, that it is never identical
with itself but always identical with what is other than it-
self, Leibniz would have no defense. This is just to say
that substantial reality (being itself) remains a presuppo-
sition for Leibniz. Since this presupposition is a necessary
condition for representative thoughts, it follows that the
thesis that thought is representative is also a presupposi-
tion for Leibniz.
Equally as famous as Hume's critique of the simplicity
of the self is Kant's critique of the same doctrine in his
Critique of Pure Reason. He writes:
The proposition 'A thought can only be the effect
(Wirkung ) of the absolute unity of the thinking
being' cannot be treated as analytic. For the
unity of the thought, which consists in many
representations, is collective, and as far as
mere concepts can show, may relate just as well
to the collective unity of many substances
acting together (as the motion of a body is the
composite motion of all of its parts) as to the
absolute unity of the subject. Consequently,
the necessity of presupposing, in the case of a
composite thought, a simple substance, cannot be
demonstrated in accordince with the principle of
identity
.
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Leibnizians might offer the following analysis of
Kant's argument. Insofar as Kant attributes a collective
unity to the thought which consists in many representations,
he also attributes to it some manner of reality. This is
so since whatever has unity (of whatever kind) also has being
(of some kind). Kant-'s argument is that this collective
unity of the thought may relate to the collective unity of
the action of several substances just as well as to the
absolute unity of the action of the thinking being. It
follows that the manner of reality he must assign to the
thought must also be related to this collective unity of
action. For Leibniz, as we have seen, all collective unity
is constituted by the numerical oneness of the thought
*7
which thinks the many as singly real. Conseguently
,
for
Leibniz, the collective unity of the action of several dif-
ferent substances must itself be a unity of thought thinking
the several actions as singly real, that is, as a single act.
Furthermore, this thought must also contain several represen-
tations since I cannot think the several actions as a single
act without representing each of these actions separately.
That is, a representation of each of the several actions
must be contained in my thought if I am to think them as a
single act. It follows that the unity of this thought is
also a collective unity and so, on Kant's analysis, must be
related to the collective unity of the action of several
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different substances. Thus, Kant's analysis generates an
infinite regress. The unity of the first thought is related
to the unity of a second and that in turn to the unity of a
third, and so on ad infinitum.
On Kant's analysis, no manner of reality can be attrib-
uted to thought. This- is as follows. Since Kant attributes
a collective unity to thought he must also attribute a col-
lective reality to it. But the reality of a collection
cannot be intrinsic to it. The concept of an intrinsically
real whole of parts is a self-contradictory concept.
^
Therefore, the reality of the thought must belong to some-
thing other than itself, specifically, it must belong to
whatever it is to which its unity is related. But that to
which its unity is related is itself a thought, and the
reality of this thought is also not intrinsic to it and so
must be related to the reality of yet a third thought, and
so on. It follows that the condition upon which any thought
has reality, namely, that the thought to which it is related
be real, cannot be fulfilled. Since no manner of reality
can be assigned to thought, neither can any manner of unity,
and this contradicts the hypothesis of the argument.
Leibnizians may conclude that not by this argument at least
has Kant shown that the unity of several representations in
a single thought is compatable with the denial that this
unity is the action of the absolute unity of the thinking
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being.
In the field of contemporary metaphysics, the theory
of transcendental being can be usefully applied to the
general problem of interpretation as it emerges in regard
to works of art as well as to philosophical and religious
writings. The transcendentals constitute a possibility of
being which is intermediate between subjectivity and objectiv
ity. Unity, for example, while identical with being in re is
nonetheless distinguishable from being as regards its concept
?ne. > writes Aquinas, "adds something to being logically". ^
Unity does not come before us as a reality added to being
,
rather, as a conceptual note not already thought in the
concept of being. But, since unity is identical with being,
its reality cannot consist in its being thought; if it did,
being itself would become strictly equivalent to being
thought. Gottfried Martin writes:
One immediately sees that the interpretation
of unity as an Idea and its interpretation
as a res in the sense of a real accident
both remain unsatisfying. This was per-
ceived early on and has led to the insight
that the disjunction: something is either
real or a mere conception, is insufficient.
Instead, it proves to be necessary to regard
transcendental being as a new, intermediate
possibility of being. . . .
. . . Transcendental unity is neither a
reality in the sense of a res nor is it a
mere conception. It has a reference to
ratio but its being is not exhausted in being-
conceived ... we see here emerging a new,
third mode of being, which transcendens the
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old disjunction
rationis . 10
between ens reale and ens
The need for a mode of being intermediate between sub-
jectivity and objectivity emerges rather forcibly in the
theory of interpretation, in one important tradition,
interpretation is held to be at least partially the outcome
of one's own experience of the work. The interpretation is
purported to have a more than merely personal validity de-
spite the fact that not all of what is required for another
to determine its validity is contained within itself. The
general effort to construct a model for interpretation in
which the experience of the interpreter himself plays a
decisive role goes back to the work of Schliermacher and his
immediate predecessors, Friedrich Ast and Friedrich August
Wolf. in the field of recent biblical interpretation, the
name of Rudolph Butlmann comes to mind whose program for the
demythologization of the bible essentially involves the
interpreters own existential self-understanding as provided
by the New Testament kergyma
. As an e xample of such an
interpretative model, consider the following account of
Jasper's Nietzsche interpretation offered by Richard Howey:
For Jaspers, to interpret Nietzsche means
to enter into dialogue with Nietzsche's
Exis tenz as it finds expression in Nietzsche's
writings. . . . Jaspers emphatically denies
that such dialogue is "merely subjective," and,
since it is clearly not "objective" in any
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ordinary empirical sense, this suggests thatthere is some kind of self-validating
objectivity which resides with the trans-
cendental character of Existenz itself.
- • . Even though this middle ground whichJaspers occupies between subjectivity and
objectivity is well protected, it is nonethe-less problematic
. .
.11
Finally, in the field of aesthetic interpretation, one
might mention the name of John Dewey. For Dewey, aesthetic
experiences are not wholley subjective, nor, of course, are
they wholley objective. "The experiences," he writes, "that
art intensifies and amplifies /do not/ exist solely inside
ourselves
. . . Art would not amplify experience if it
withdrew the self into the self nor would the experience that
results from such retirement be expressive."^
Whether as the experience of something presented through
the text (Nietzsche's Existenz
,
the New Testament kergyma )
or as the aesthetic experience of the work of art, such
experiences are held to have more than a merely subjective
validity while yet having no objective reference in the work
itself. Perhaps the interpretative models devised for re-
search in these various fields can be shown to have a common
root in the theory of transcendental being. All interpreta-
tion, it might be argued, articulates the apprehension of a
transcendental characteristic. As we said earlier, such
characteristics, for example, unity, come before us not as
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a property of an object but as a thought content not already
contained in our concept of the object. It is useful to
recall here that unity is only one of the transcendental
characteristics distinguished in scholastic tradition. In
addition to being and unity, Aquinas added the concepts of
goodness, truth, thing-, and something, and perhaps even
beauty. Duns Scotus further expanded the number of
transcendenta Is by introducing the idea of disjunctive trans-
cendentals
,
for example, every being is either infinite or
finite, simple or compound, necessary or contingent, etc.^
Thus, it might be argued that the aesthetic features of
a musical composition, for example, its unity of form and
content, its sonority, and so on are not to be found among
its objective features but nevertheless have a reality not
exhausted by their being thought. A similar point can be
made about the being of Nietzsche's Existenz
. Here too I
apprehend a transcendental characteristic. This being is
not to be found among the objective facts of Nietzsche's
life and writings, nevertheless it is not a mere thought
construct. The analysis of the proclamation of the New
Testament might proceed along similar lines.
The application of this analysis to Nietzsche's
Existenz or the kergyma is complicated by the fact that in
both cases, transcendental being is attributed to a mode of
self-hood which comes into play in the interpretative act;
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namely, Jaspers's own Existenz and Bultmann’s own existential
self-understanding. Here the transcendental character of my
own being can be pointed out and, as such, distinguished
from myself as mere subject. Insofar as this being enters
into the interpretative act (as, for example, participant in
a dialogue between Exlstenzen ) the interpretation itself
achieves a more than merely subjective validity.
With these suggestions for further study we bring our
work to a close. It is our hope that the insights into
Leibniz s thought which we have achieved not be taken as
final but as opening up new possibilities for interpretation.
As always, the promise of such interpretation is a deeper
understanding of oneself.
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